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I. INTRODUCTION 
The personal guaranty sometimes seems like the neglected 
stepchild of commercial law - ever present, but seldom noticed. It is a 
device of overwhelming importance in small business finance and real 
estate development, areas that account for well over half of the United 
States' economy! and an overwhelming proportion of the country's busi-
ness bankruptcy caseload.2 Despite this fact, the literature on guaranties 
* Associate Professor, Hofstra University School of Law (Iawmet@hofstra.edu); J.D., 
M.B.A., 1990, University of Pennsylvania; B.A., 1983, Yale University. I am grateful to Bernie 
Jacob, Mark Movsesian, Norm Silber, and Julian Velasco for comments on earlier drafts of this 
article, and to Hofstra Law School for financial support for my research and writing. Permission 
is hereby granted for copies of this article to be made and used by nonprofit institutions for 
educational purposes, provided that the author and University of Miami Law Review are notified 
and are identified on each copy. Proper notice of copyright must be affixed to each copy. 
1. The Small Business Administration credits small business with employing approximately 
54% of the nongovernmental workforce and making more than half of all sales. See UNITED 
STATES SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, PUB. No. FS0040, THE FACTS ABOUT SMALL 
BUSINESS (1996). Real estate enterprises, excluding construction, employed more than 1.4 million 
people in 1995. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 
OF THE UNITED STATES 511, TABLE 793 (l18th ed. 1998). The value of commercial mortgages 
outstanding in 1997 was in excess of $800 billion. See id. at 521, TABLE 816. 
2. See Hon. Lisa Hill Fenning & Craig A. Hart, Measuring Chapter 11: The Real World of 
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is tiny compared to that generated in the last few decades on other com-
mercial law topics, like secured transactions, corporate fiduciary duties 
or bankruptcy theory. 
This is not to say that guaranties have been completely ignored. 
Several problems raised by the treatment of guaranties in bankruptcy 
have received a great deal of attention. An extraordinary number of 
words have been devoted to the Deprizio preference problem,3 and a 
substantial number of cases and articles have addressed questions of 
bankruptcy court jurisdiction and/or statutory authority to enjoin suits 
against third-party guarantors.4 In these discussions, however, the 
problems raised by guaranties have almost always been addressed on a 
doctrinal or ad hoc basis, without any guiding conceptual framework. 
Practically no effort has been devoted to developing a foundation for the 
analysis akin to that which has evolved in the secured transactions litera-
ture.5 Little has been done to explain the fundamental role of guaranties 
in commercial credit arrangements or their function in the bankruptcy 
process - matters logically prior to the specific issues with which the 
literature and cases have grappled. 
The purpose of this article is to bring commercial guaranties within 
the common framework of agency analysis that has been so fruitful in 
other areas of commercial law, focusing specifically on one of the most 
common and problematic areas of guaranty law, the insider guaranty 
(that is, a guaranty from a principal shareholder or manager) in a 
closely-held firm. The first two parts of this article attempt to develop a 
general framework for thinking about insider guaranties and their role in 
small business finance, a theme that is further developed in the final 
section of the article, which considers the relationship between insider 
guaranties and some fundamental attributes of the U.S. bankruptcy sys-
tem. Part IV shows the value of this framework in thinking through the 
policy and legal questions raised by insider guaranties by focusing on 
500 Cases, 4 AM. BANKR.INsT. L. REv. 119 (1996) (reporting that out of 510 Chapter II cases on 
Judge Fenning's docket in 1991-94, only one was a public company, and 85% reported assets and 
liabilities between $100,000 and $10 million); Ed Flynn, Size of Chapter 11 Cases, 12-JAN AM. 
BANKR. INsT. J. 22 (1994) (reporting that nearly two-thirds of all Chapter II cases involve less 
than $500,000 in assets and only about 10% exceed $2.5 million in liabilities); Douglas G. Baird, 
Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11,36 J.L. & EcON. 633, 636-37 (1993) (stating that two-thirds or 
more of Chapter II cases are "mom-and-pop" businesses with less than $500,000 in assets; the 
majority of the rest are "closely held firms of substantial size"; and only ten to twenty publicly 
owned firms file for bankruptcy in a typical year). 
3. See infra Part IV.A. 
4. See infra Part IV.B. 
5. The single, and important, exception to this is Avery Weiner Katz, An Economic Analysis 
of The Guaranty Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 47 (1999), which lays out a structure for 
considering the economic functions of guaranties. Professor Katz's article, while an important 
start, does not specifically address the bankruptcy issues considered here. 
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two important and contentious areas: the Deprizio doctrine in preference 
law,6 and bankruptcy proofing through the use of springing or exploding 
guaranties.7 
The central thesis of this article is that insider guaranties serve a 
critical, salutary and underappreciated function in reducing agency costs. 
The insider guaranty is not primarily a means of securing repayment 
from the guarantor should the firm default, as it is often viewed. Rather, 
it is a bonding device intended to align the interests of the insider with 
those of the creditor, thus mitigating the perverse incentives faced by 
shareholders as a firm nears insolvency.8 While this fact has been noted 
in the past,9 it has never been put in a full theoretical context that recog-
nizes the functions of the guaranty in commercial finance and the bank-
ruptcy system, and so it often seems to be forgotten in crucial policy 
debates. 
Part I of this article provides a review of the financial agency prob-
lem and common strategies that parties use to ameliorate it. Over the 
past several decades, many ad hoc intuitions and judgments in corporate 
and commercial law have been harmonized and explained through the 
overarching concept of agency costS.lO This insight, dating from the 
seminal work of Jensen and Meckling,11 has allowed diverse problems 
to be addressed from a common framework. Thus, the scope of fiduci-
ary duties in corporate law is commonly understood as a response to the 
agency problems that arise from the separation of ownership and con-
trol,12 and the functions of secured credit or bond covenants are typically 
analyzed in terms of the agency problems inherent in the separation of 
different classes of ownership interests. 13 
The financial agency problem - the divergence between share-
6. See infra Part IV.A. 
7. See infra Part IV.B. 
8. See infra Part II.A. 
9. See, e.g., Andrew J. Nussbaum, Insider Preferences and the Problems of Self-Dealing 
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 603, 614 (l990); Isaac Nutovic, The Bankruptcy 
Preference Laws: Interpreting Code Sections 547(c), 550(a)(1) and 546(a)(/), 41 Bus. LAw. 175, 
196 (1985); Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending, 86 GEO. L.J. 
1,,6 (1997); Thomas E. Pitts, Jr., Insider Guaranties and the Law of Preferences, 55 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 343, 354 (1981). 
10. "Agency costs include the costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts 
among agents with conflicting interests, plus the residual loss incurred because the cost of full 
enforcement of contracts exceeds the expected benefits." Eugene F. Fama & Michael E. Jensen, 
Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & BeON. 327, 327 (1983). 
II. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 1. FIN. EeoN. 305 (1976). 
12. See infra Part II.B.1. 
13. See infra Part II.B.2. "Ownership" in this context refers not just to ownership of the 
equity interests in a firm, but rather the interests of all parties with claims against the firm. See, 
e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of 
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holder and creditor interests - grows as a firm nears insolvency. As 
this happens, creditors share a series of related concerns that can be 
lumped together under the rubric of perverse pre-bankruptcy incentives. 
These concerns include the risks of overinvestment and underinvest-
ment, which refer to the incentives for shareholdersl4 to be either too 
receptive or too averse to high-risk, high-return investments as a firm 
nears bankruptcy. Misappropriation, where shareholders will cause the 
firm's assets to be distributed to themselves at the expense of creditors 
(through increased dividend payments, for example), is another possibil-
ity. Dissipation is the related concern that equity owners may prefer to 
avoid bankruptcy for as long as possible, even if the firm is hemorrhag-
ing money, while dismemberment refers to the risk that creditors will 
enforce their remedies against the firm, breaking it up and sacrificing its 
going-concern value. These problems are laid out in more detail below, 
including a discussion on various legal and contractual devices used to 
control these risks, such as fiduciary duties, secured credit, debt cove-
nants and bankruptcy rules. 
Part II expands the discussion to include the role of the insider 
guaranty in mitigating these agency problems. The insider guaranty is a 
commitment from a party in a position to control or influence a firm's 
decisionmaking - typically a majority or sole shareholder - to pay a 
debt owed by the firm should the firm default. This guaranty serves 
several purposes. First, it provides an additional source of assets that the 
creditor can reach if the firm defaults. Second, it increases the leverage 
that the creditor has over the firm's management should the firm get into 
financial trouble. The insider may cause the firm to pay the guarantied 
debt, leaving other creditors out in the cold. In some circumstances, an 
insider might even agree to allow a viable firm to be liquidated to avoid 
personal liability on the guaranty. These possibilities have become the 
primary focus of critics, who decry the creditor's ability to use its lever-
age to advantage itself at the potential expense of the firm in general, 
and of other creditors in particular. 
This is obviously a real concern, but too often it has become the 
sole focus of analysis, blocking from view the vital positive functions 
served by the leverage inherent in an insider guaranty. The insider guar-
anty curiously inverts some commonly identified methods of resolving 
financial agency costs, particularly the acute costs that arise in insol-
Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in 
Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97,100 n.15 (1984). 
14. While the divergence between shareholder and management interests is a central theme in 
corporate law, given the focus of this article on insider guaranties, primarily provided by the major 
equity owner in a closely held firm, shareholders and managers are often addressed 
interchangeably. 
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vency. In recent years, numerous scholars have pointed out that the vio-
lation of absolute priority may be justified as a means of mitigating 
these incentive problems. IS Alternatively, scholars have suggested that a 
"chameleon equity" or "contingent equity" scheme, in which the 
existing equity interests are canceled and creditors automatically become 
the equity holders upon insolvency, could provide a contractual solution 
to financial distress, and have argued that this contractual solution could 
eliminate the need for bankruptcy reorganization provisions such as 
Chapter 11.16 Incentive problems can also be ameliorated through the 
use of preferred stock, convertible bonds or, to a lesser extent, bond 
covenants. 
These proposals are generally made in the context of publicly held 
companies, and in that setting they make a great deal of sense. As 
shown below, however, financial agency problems are handled through 
a markedly different device in closely-held firms. The insider guaranty 
generally accomplishes the same result as the creation of chameleon 
equity in terms of mitigating perverse prebankruptcy incentives, but in 
the opposite manner. Rather than turning creditors into equity holders 
upon default, it puts the insider-guarantor in the position of a junior 
creditor. 17 
Further light can be shed on the functions of the insider guaranty by 
comparing it with what is perhaps the most studied commercial finance 
arrangement, secured credit, a comparison undertaken in Part ITI.B. As 
a doctrinal matter, the two fall on opposite sides of several important 
categorical divides: A security interest is a property right, while a guar-
anty is a contract right; A security interest is a right in the borrower's 
property, while a guaranty is a right against a third party; The transfer 
effected by a security interest takes place upon the recordation of that 
interest (typically prepetition), while the transfer effected by a guaranty 
takes place only upon its enforcement (typically postpetition). Despite 
these difference, the two devices are more alike economically than is 
often recognized, and the commonalities raise interesting and important 
questions about their relative legal treatment. 
Part ITI concludes with an examination of the implications of 
insider guaranties for the functioning of the bankruptcy system with 
respect to smaller firms. Although the literature seems never to have 
touched on the point, some of the dissatisfaction with small business 
bankruptcy may be attributable to the prevalence of insider guaranties, 
which can have adverse effects on debtor/creditor negotiations in the 
15. See infra Part II.B.3. 
16. See infra text accompanying notes 89-94. 
17. See infra Part III.A. 
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subset of situations that are most likely to end up in bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
Part IV applies the framework and insights developed in the first 
two sections of this article in a number of important contexts, the first 
of which is perhaps the most contentious area of bankruptcy law as it 
has been applied to insider guaranties. In the Deprizio problem, as it is 
known, the issue is whether payments to a creditor, who holds a guar-
anty from an insider, should be considered preferences for the full one-
year preference period for payments "to or for the benefit of'IS an 
"insider,"19 or just for the ordinary ninety-day preference period. This 
question generated an extraordinary amount of heat in both professional 
and academic circles20 until it was resolved21 by Congress in the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1994.22 Building on the analysis presented in Part 
III, Part IV argues that this "fix" adopted by Congress can be expected 
to worsen problems associated with insider guaranties and also deprive 
insider guaranties of some of their inherent value. 
Part IV.B. examines a problem that has garnered little judicial 
attention to date, but is likely to become a focus of widespread and 
heated litigation during the next economic downturn. During the 1990s, 
practitioners fastened on the concept of "springing" and "exploding" 
guaranties - that is, insider guaranties that take effect only if the bor-
rower files for bankruptcy. These devices have become commonplace, 
even though practitioners freely admit they have no idea whether they 
will be enforceable.23 To date, there is very little case law and no schol-
arly analysis addressing these instruments, making them a particularly 
important area on which to focus before the next recession brings the 
18. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(I) (1999). 
19. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1999). 
20. A search of WESTLAW's JLR (Journals and Law Reviews) database as of January 2000 
discloses 365 articles that at least mention "Deprizio," and twenty-three separate articles that 
expressly refer to the Deprizio case in their titles. 
21. For a discussion of issues left unresolved by the 1994 amendments, see generally 
Lawrence Ponoroff, Now You See It, Now You Don't: An Unceremonious Encore for Two-
Transfer Thinking in the Analysis of Indirect Preferences, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 203 (1995). 
22. See Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 202 (1994). 
23. See, e.g., John C. Murray, Exploding and Springing Guarantees, in COMMERCIAL REAL 
ESTATE FINANCING: WHAT BORROWERS NEED TO KNow Now 1999303,305 (PLI Real Est. Law 
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. 0028, 1999) ("The validity and enforceability of 
springing and exploding guarantees may be attacked in a bankruptcy proceeding on a number of 
theories (which mayor may not be successful)."); Sanford A. Weiner, Borrower's Counsel's 
Review of the Loan Commitment and Loan Documents, in COMMERCIAL SECURITIZATION FOR 
REAL ESTATE LAWYERS 399,404 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, March 25, 1999) ("To the extent 
that it attempts to punish the borrower itself for seeking protection under the Bankruptcy Code, 
there are policy arguments why the springing guaranty should be unenforceable. . .. In addition to 
the effect of his/her client, borrower's counsel will need to address the enforceability issue in his! 
her opinion letter."). 
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issue to a head. As shown below, springing and exploding guaranties 
exacerbate financial agency costs, creating a disproportionate incentive 
to avoid bankruptcy in a way that ordinary insider guaranties do not. 
Moreover, they produce a negotiation problem that renders them even 
more troubling than simple bankruptcy waivers (which are generally 
held to be unenforceable). For these reasons, I argue that bankruptcy 
courts should bar the enforcement of springing and exploding 
guaranties. 
Finally, Part V offers some concluding thoughts, putting the insider 
guaranty into a broader context that draws on Professor Skeel's insights 
into the co-evolution of bankruptcy and corporate law regimes,2~ Pri-
vate and public companies handle financial agency costs in markedly 
different ways, yet they are generally subject to the same bankruptcy 
system. Insider guaranties appear to be a market-generated corrective 
aimed at aligning a bankruptcy system designed for public companies, 
and ill-adapted to the needs of closely-held firms, to the unique charac-
teristics of these smaller but overwhelmingly numerous entities. 
ll. FINANCIAL AGENCY COSTS 
A. An Overview of Financial Agency Costs 
Corporate law and commercial law come together in their attempts 
to explain the legal and contractual mechanisms that shareholders, credi-
tors, and managers use to deal with agency problems. Any time a prin-
cipal must delegate authority to an agent, costs must be incurred in 
attempting to ensure that the agent faithfully carries out its duties.25 In 
the public corporation, shareholders provide capital, but cannot them-
selves manage the enterprise in which their capital is invested. This 
raises the managerial agency problem. That is, shareholders must some-
how ensure that the managers they hire serve the shareholders' interests 
rather than their own.26 This problem is generally addressed through 
management compensation structures that try to align managerial and 
24. See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and 
Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1325 (1998) [hereinafter Skeel, Evolutionary Theory]. 
25. Jensen and Meckling break agency costs down into three subcategories: monitoring costs, 
bonding costs, and the residual loss that is not avoided by these techniques. Jensen & Meckling, 
supra note II, at 308. Monitoring costs are the costs incurred by a principal in attempting to 
oversee and control the behavior of her agent. See id. Bonding costs are the costs incurred by the 
agent to "guarantee that he will not take certain actions which would harm the principal or to 
ensure that the principal will be compensated if [the agent] does take such actions." [d. Finally, 
because it is impossible to perfectly align the agent's and principal's interests, there are some 
remaining agency costs that must always be borne. See id. at 308 n. 9. 
26. The problems inherent in the separation of ownership and control in large corporations 
was the central theme of a seminal work by Adolfe A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, THE 
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
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shareholder interests, and by the fiduciary duties that the board of direc-
tors owes to shareholders. When the corporation turns to creditors for 
additional capital, however, a new agency problem arises because the 
corporation will be managed for the benefit of the shareholders - at the 
creditors' expense, if need be. 
The managerial agency problem is generally of limited importance 
in closely-held corporations; management can be expected to further 
shareholders' interests because management and equity are essentially 
identical. However, precisely because management interests are per-
fectly aligned with shareholders', the financial agency problem between 
shareholder and creditor interests is intensified.27 
One of the central agency costs incurred as a firm approaches insol-
vency is the distortion of investment incentives. As a firm nears insol-
vency, different classes of claimants will have different preferences 
regarding the risk/return profile of projects that the firm should under-
take, and the variability of a project's potential returns may become 
more important to the parties than the expected return itself. As a result, 
an insolvent or struggling firm may pursue inefficient investments. 
The first example of this is the "underinvestment" problem - the 
resistance of shareholders to profitable investments that have a low vari-
ance.28 Using an illustration first provided by Franks and Torous, con-
sider a firm with $70 in fixed assets and debt of $100.29 The firm has an 
opportunity to eam $50 by investing $35. Obviously, this is a worth-
while investment, having a positive net present value of $15 ($50 - $35). 
However, there is no reason for shareholders to bother with the invest-
ment, since the firm's assets will be worth only $85 if the project is 
successful. This would enhance the return to creditors, but it still leaves 
no value for the shareholders. To generalize, shareholders in an insol-
vent firm may not have adequate incentives to pursue investments that 
have a positive net present value, but low variance.3° 
27. See, e.g., F.H. Buckley, The Termination Decision, 61 UMKC L. REv. 243, 259-60 
(1992) (noting that compensation arrangements that align management interests with equity 
holders decrease agency costs while the firm is solvent, but may increase agency costs when the 
firm is in financial distress); Susan Rose Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and 
Investment Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1991) (showing that managerial self-interest may 
cause managers in public companies to act in ways closer to creditor interests than shareholder 
interest). 
28. The classic work on the underinvestment problem is Stewart C. Meyers, Determinants of 
Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977). 
29. See Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, An Empirical Investigation of u.s. Firms in 
Reorganization, 44 J. FIN. 747, 765 (1989). 
30. Note that creditors have an equal and opposite set of incentives; thus, creditors may resist 
the firm's effort to engage in positive NPV projects where those projects are high in risk. See, 
e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Truth About Secured Financing, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1436, 1452 
(1997). 
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The flip side of this is the "overinvestment" or asset substitution 
problem. Any time a firm has issued debt, equity holders have an incen-
tive to increase the riskiness of the firm's investments because the 
downside risk is shared with the debt holders. As a firm nears insol-
vency, this incentive to shift the firm from safer to riskier investments 
grows. Consider an adaptation of the facts above, in which the firm has 
a unique opportunity to make the following investment: The firm can 
risk $30 of its assets on a project with a 10% chance of returning $200, 
and a 90% chance of returning nothing. Note that this investment has a 
net present value of negative $1031 ; in other words, a value maximizing 
firm would reject the opportunity. From the shareholders' perspective, 
however, the investment is appealing. If the investment is not made, the 
entire value of the firm ($70) will go to the firm's creditors, leaving no 
value for the equity holders. If the investment is made, there is a 90% 
chance that the creditors will receive $40 and the equity holders will 
receive nothing, but a 10% chance that the creditors will be repaid their 
full $100 and the equity holders will receive $140.32 This investment 
reduces the expected value of the creditors' claims from $70 to $4633, 
but it increases the expected value of the equity from $0 to $14?4 Thus, 
equity holders may be quite happy to have the firm invest in a project 
with a negative expected, net present value if the variance in the returns 
is high enough.35 
A related form of misbehavior that must be protected against is 
dissipation of the firm's assets through the suboptimal use of bank-
ruptcy. For example, a firm that suffers from ongoing operating losses 
may choose not to file for bankruptcy even though bankruptcy would 
maximize the firm's value because managers are interested in preserving 
their jobs for as long as possible, or in order to extend equity's option in 
the hope of a miraculous turnaround.36 The opposite problem may exist 
as well. If the firm's decision-makers prefer to file for bankruptcy even 
when it is not in the firm's best interest (because they benefit from the 
31. The investment has an expected payoff of (.10 x $200) + (.90 x $0) = 20, but a cost of 
$30, for a net present value of $20 - $30 = -$10. 
32. That is, the firm will have a value of $200 from the investment, plus the other $40 of its 
initial assets, leaving $140 for equity after the creditors have received their full $100. 
33. (90% x $40) + (10% x $100) = $46. 
34. (90% x 0) + (10% x 140) = $14. 
35. For empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis, see Katherine H. Daigle & Michael T. 
Maloney, Residual Claims in Bankruptcy: An Agency Theory Approach, 37 J.L. & ECON. 157, 167 
(1994); Moshe Kim & Vojislav Maksimovic, Debt and Input Misallocation, 45 J. FIN. 795 (1990). 
For a contrary view of the evidence, see Royce de R. Barondes, Fiduciary Duties of Officers and 
Directors of Distressed Corporations, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 45, 59-63 (1998). 
36. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay 
on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REv. ISS, 170 (1989). 
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violation of absolute priority in bankruptcy, for example), then there 
may be more than the optimal number of filings. In either case, some 
system is needed that will tend to get firms into the bankruptcy process 
at an optimal time.37 
Another related category of debtor misbehavior is misappropriation 
of the firm's assets. Shareholder managers can be expected to use their 
positions to attempt to transfer wealth from the firm to themselves as 
bankruptcy becomes more likely. This may be done through excess div-
idend distributions, stock buybacks, the repayment of insider debt, or 
fraudulent transfers of the firm's assets. This type of misbehavior may 
be engaged in for the immediate gains or, more subtly, shareholders may 
sometimes choose actions that hurt the firm in order to induce creditors 
to renegotiate their rights.38 
It is not only the equity holders who may pursue suboptimal strate-
gies in furthering their self-interest. Bankruptcy is often described as a 
solution to a "common pool" problem confronting creditors who, in try-
ing to maximize their own recoveries, may destroy the firm's going con-
cern value. Outside of bankruptcy, creditors may enforce their rights 
against the debtor, and the first creditor to establish a claim to an asset 
belonging to the firm is entitled to be paid out of that asset. Secured 
creditors may foreclose on their collateral and apply the proceeds to 
their claims. Unsecured creditors may bring suit and then levy on assets, 
subject only to prior liens on those assets. The result is a potentially 
wasteful "race to the courthouse," as each creditor seeks to beat others to 
the firm's limited pool of assets.39 Creditors may therefore overinvest in 
monitoring the debtor and enforcing their rights; moreover, the race to 
secure repayment by levying on the firm's assets may result in the dis-
memberment of the firm, sacrificing any going concern value the firm 
may have.40 
The contractual relationship between the firm and its creditors must 
somehow be designed to minimize the total cost of these various types 
of misbehavior, including prevention costs and the costs of losses not 
37. See generally Randal C. Picker, Voluntary Petitions And The Creditors' Bargain, .61 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 519 (1992); Douglas G. Baird, The Initiation Problem in Bankruptcy, IIINT'L REv. 
L. & ECON. 223 (1991). 
38. See generally Yaacov Z. Bergman & Jeffery L. Callen, Opportunistic Underinvestment in 
Debt Renegotiation and Capital Structure, 291. FIN. ECON. 137 (1991). 
39. See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' 
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 860-67 (1982). 
40. See id. at 864-65. Moreover, the problem of dismemberment or undue creditor leverage is 
particularly acute in the context of small business borrowers who rely heavily on a few financing 
relationships - precisely the situation where insider guaranties are most prevalent. See, e.g., 
Jackson & Scott, supra note 36, at 170. 
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avoided. The major devices used to accomplish this are summarized in 
the next section. 
B. Responses to Financial Agency Costs 
1. FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
One of corporate law's basic tools for controlling agency problems 
is the fiduciary duty of management. In its broad outlines, the structure 
of fiduciary duties in the corporate setting appears flexible enough to 
deal with the divergence of interests between shareholders and creditors. 
The directors of a solvent corporation owe their fiduciary duties (duties 
of loyalty and of care) to the corporation's shareholders, and owe credi-
tors only the contractual duties that have been agreed to by the parties. 
However, as a company approaches insolvency, the directors may come 
to owe a fiduciary duty to creditors as well,41 and that duty may shift 
entirely to creditors once the firm is insolvent.42 Once a company 
becomes a debtor in possession in a bankruptcy reorganization case, 
management owes its fiduciary duties to the estate, rather than to any 
particular constituency. 43 
This pattern is commonly explained by considering who holds the 
"residual interest" in the firm.44 In other words, fiduciary duties are 
owed to the parties who will benefit or lose from a marginal profit or 
10ss,45 thereby creating an incentive to make economically efficient 
41. See, e.g., Credit Lyonnnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 
LEXIS 215, at *108 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30,1991) ("Where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of 
insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue [sic] risk bearers, but owes 
its duty to the corporate enterprise" as a whole, rather than any single group of stakeholders.). 
42. See, e.g., Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992); Collie 
v. Becknell, 762 P.2d 727 (Colo. App. 1988); Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Mann, 177 Cal. Rptr. 495 
(Cal. App. 4th 1981); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Buckhead Am. Corp. v. Reliance 
Capital Group, Inc. (In re Buckhead Am. Corp.), 178 B.R. 956 (Bankr. D. Del. 1994); Miramar 
Resources, Inc. v. Shultz (In re Shultz), 208 B.R. 723 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997); FDIC v. Sea Pines 
Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1982), em. denied, 461 U.S. 928 (1983). 
43. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985) 
(''The fiduciary duty of a trustee runs to shareholders as well as to creditors."); In re Central Ice 
Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1072 (7th Cir. 1987) (arguing that debtor-in-possession has duty "to 
maximize the value of the estate, not of a particular group of claimants"). 
44. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, 17 
CARDOZO L. REv. 647, 667-68 (1996); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUcruRE OF CORPORATE LAW 67-70 (1991); Christopher W. Frost, Running The 
Asylum: Governance Problems in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 34 ARIZ. L. REv. 89, 114-15 
(1992); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making 
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REv. 23 
(1991). 
45. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the 
Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 738, 775 (1988) ("[T]he law of 
corporate reorganizations should focus on identifying the residual owner, limiting agency 
problems in representing the residual owner, and making sure that the residual owner has control 
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decisions. When the firm is solvent (assets exceed liabilities), creditors 
will receive their contractually fixed payments, and additional profits or 
losses will accrue to the shareholders. Once the firm becomes insolvent 
(debts exceed assets), creditors will receive only part of their claims, and 
additional profits or losses will increase or decrease the payments to 
these creditors.46 Thus, the directors' fiduciary duties run to the credi-
tors upon insolvency because they become the residual claimants, the 
parties who stand to gain or lose based on the decisions made by 
management. 
If the corporation continued to be run for the benefit of the firm's 
shareholders, rather than its creditors, the firm could be expected to 
make overly-risky investments.47 If these investments paid off, the firm 
would become solvent and shareholders would benefit; if they were 
unsuccessful, the loss would reduce the payments to creditors, but share-
holders (who were not going to receive anything anyway) would be no 
worse off. Shifting the directors' fiduciary duties to the creditors is a 
means of controlling this incentive toward excessive risk. 
This simple shift of fiduciary duties, however, is not adequate to 
resolve the problem of perverse pre-bankruptcy incentives. While 
overly-risky policies present one risk to creditors, there is a symmetrical 
problem if creditors are put in control: Shareholders have an incentive to 
take on too much risk when a firm is insolvent because they do not bear 
the downside, but the creditors may be too risk-averse because they do 
not keep the entire upside.48 When creditors of a slightly insolvent firm 
consider an investment that would restore solvency, they know that they 
would bear any losses, while the lion's share of the gains would go to 
shareholders. Directing fiduciary duties to creditors upon insolvency 
may alleviate the overinvestment problem, but it brings with it a risk of 
underinvestment. 49 
over the negotiations that the firm must make while it is restructuring."); Frost, supra note 44, at 
135-38 (suggesting that bankruptcy judges should give particular weight to the views of the 
residual claimants). 
46. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the 
Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured 
Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 106-109 (1984). 
47. See supra Part II.A. 
48. For a caveat to this generalization, see Barondes, supra note 35, at 51-59 (arguing that a 
lender holding debt with a below market rate of interest may prefer that the near-insolvent 
borrower undertake risky strategies, hoping that the debtor will violate its loan covenants). 
49. See, e.g., Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R. Vetsuypens, Creditor Control in Financially 
Distressed Firms: Empirical Evidence, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1005, 1010-11 (1994) (suggesting that 
creditors may obtain overly restrictive covenants in debt restructurings, "causing firms to forgo 
risky, but profitable, investment opportunities"); Buckley, supra note 27, at 252-56; Laura Lin, 
Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to 
Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REv. 1485 (1993) (arguing that directors should have a duty to maximize 
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Fiduciary duties are not particularly effective at controlling finan-
cial agency costs. As just noted, they only deal with a subset of the 
incentive problems that arise on insolvency. Moreover, the justified 
reluctance of courts to elevate their judgment of business issues over the 
judgment of management leads to the remarkably lenient "business 
judgment rule," which renders actions for breach of the duty of care 
extremely difficult to win.50 And the situation is even worse in closely-
held firms, where the equity holders are the primary decision makers. It 
is unlikely that the uncertain threat of a future lawsuit for breach of 
fiduciary duty will be sufficient to get management to place creditor 
interests over their own interests as equity holders.51 For these reasons, 
the vague standards of fiduciary duty law are often supplemented by 
specific contractual undertakings, such as bond covenants and collateral, 
intended to provide more effective protection for stakeholders' interests. 
2. CONTRACTUAL COVENANTS AND SECURED CREDIT 
Contractual agreements provide the most obvious mechanism for 
mitigating agency costs that arise from the divergent interests of credi-
tors and equity holders. To take the simplest example, bond indentures 
almost always include restrictions on the firm's ability to pay dividends, 
thereby attempting to stop shareholders of a troubled firm from misap-
propriating its value. Among the most common and important contrac-
tual devices is the provision of collateral. 
Over the last two decades, a considerable literature has developed 
to explain the functions of secured credit.52 Although the story is con-
tested,53 justifications for secured credit generally stress the value of col-
the value of the insolvent firm, rather than the interests of any particular constituency, in order to 
solve these twin problems). The possibility that creditors impose overly restrictive controls on 
debtors to mitigate the overinvestment problem is the fundamental justification for the power of 
the bankruptcy court to authorize post-petition financing that "primes" pre-existing creditors' 
claims. See generally George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession 
Financing, 46 VAND. L. REV. 901 (1993). 
50. A prominent corporate law scholar recently summed up the functioning of the business 
judgment rule as follows: "The level of care required by the fiduciary standard is low, and the 
quality of judgment required is even lower. . . . Except for directors of financial institutions, 
claims for such violations have rarely been invoked successfully in the courts." Victor Brudney, 
Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595, 599-600 n.12 (1997). 
51. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 
25 J.L. & EcON. 327, 332 (1983) (noting that in the closed corporation residual risk holders and 
firm decisionmakers are identical). 
52. For an excellent recent review, see Symposium, The Priority of Secured Debt, 82 
CORNELL L. REv. (1997); see also Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Immovable 
Object Versus the Irresistable Force: Rethinking the Relationship Between Secured Credit and 
Bankruptcy Policy, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2234, 2254-63 (1997) (summarizing the debate over the 
efficiency of secured credit). 
53. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority 
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lateral as a means of allocating the burden of monitoring the debtor to 
prevent certain types of misbehavior.54 Secured credit may protect 
against overinvestment by limiting the debtor's ability to transfer its col-
lateral and substitute more risky assets.55 It also may protect against 
underinvestment in at least two different ways. First, secured credit pro-
vides the ability to offer a priority payout to shareholders if they agree to 
finance a project that they would otherwise reject. 56 Second, collateral 
provides the creditor with leverage (the threat of foreclosure) should it 
detect suboptimal efforts by the debtor.57 Security may also reduce the 
ability of a debtor on the verge of bankruptcy to dissipate the firm's 
assets through preferential or fraudulent transfers, by giving the secured 
creditor a prior claim to the potentially transferable assets.58 Alterna-
tively, it has been suggested that collateral reduces borrowing costs by 
reducing the need for monitoring.59 
Debt covenants serve similar functions by allowing a creditor to 
call its obligation if the debtor engages in prohibited strategies.60 The 
of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 
1279 (1977) (arguing that secured credit is inefficient); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured 
Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887 (1994) (arguing that secured credit redistributes value 
from unsecured creditors to secured creditors and their debtors, resulting in inefficient 
transactions). 
54. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 30, at 1448-56 (discussing the role of secured credit in 
controlling debtor misbehavior). 
55. See id. at 1449-52; George G. Triantis, A Free-Cash-Flow Theory of Secured Debt and 
Creditor Priorities, 80 VA. L. REv. 2155 (1994) (suggesting that security reduces the cash 
available to management, thereby constraining debtor misbehavior); Hideki Kanda & Saul 
Levmore, Explaining Creditor Priorities, 80 VA. L. REV. 2103 (1994) (explaining how rules of 
temporal priority limit the ability of the firm to engage in risky asset substitution, and that 
exceptions to first-in-time priority rules may be needed to reintroduce flexibility where these 
constraints prevent efficient investments); Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy 
Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. I, 12-13 (1981) (criticizing the asset 
substitution explanation for secured credit); Barry E. Adler, An Equity-Agency Solution to the 
Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle, 22 J. LEG. STUD. 73, 78-82 (1993) (responding to Schwartz's 
critique). 
56. To use the example from above in which the shareholders reject a $35 investment with a 
certain yield of $50, the shareholders would be willing to advance the $35 needed by the firm in 
exchange for a promised repayment of, say, $45. This repayment would take priority over the 
claims of existing creditors if the shareholders are able to take a security interest in the new 
project and its proceeds. Thus, the ability to grant collateral may ameliorate the underinvestment 
problem. 
57. See Scott, supra note 30, at 1453-54. 
58. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 53, at 1330. 
59. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities 
Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1147-53 (1979). 
60. See generally George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive 
Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1073 (1995); Gilson & Vetsuypens, supra note 49, at 
1010-11; Bergman & Callen, supra note 38, at 157 -160 (explaining the use of debt covenants to 
prevent management from threatening to dissipate firm assets in order to extract value from 
creditors) . 
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loan agreement may provide that if the borrower acts in specified inap-
propriate ways (paying excess dividends, for example, or incurring addi-
tional debts), the lender may declare a default and accelerate the debt. 
This may enable the lender to recover its loan before repayment 
becomes impossible. It also imposes a cost on the borrower that dis-
courages violations of the covenants. 
Secured credit and loan covenants may prevent misbehavior not 
only by the debtor, but also by the firm's creditors. Monitoring by a 
creditor may reduce the opportunity for equity holders to misappropriate 
firm value or enter into overly-risky projects, benefitting all the firm's 
creditors. Because the benefits are shared by all creditors but the costs 
are borne by the monitoring creditor alone, creditors have an incentive to 
free ride on each other's efforts and there is likely to be an inadequate 
amount of monitoring. Thus, it has been suggested that one function of 
loan covenants and collateral is to increase the incentives to monitor by 
granting the monitoring creditor rights that will be triggered if it discov-
ers misbehavior by the debtor.61 
The problem with loan covenants and collateral as control devices 
is that it is impossible to draft contracts that deal effectively with all 
opportunities for misbehavior. For example, it is very hard to draft pro-
visions that will establish appropriate rules to govern the risk of asset 
substitution because many of the attributes that would need to be veri-
fied are difficult to monitor or to prove in court.62 Thus, loan agree-
ments are generally silent on the borrower's permissible investments.63 
3. BANKRUPTCY RULES 
Fiduciary duties, secured credit, and loan covenants are all ex ante 
controls, aimed at deterring agency problems. They are supplemented, 
however, by a set of mandatory ex post rules for correcting various types 
of destructive pre-bankruptcy manipUlation. These are the rules of 
bankruptcy, and this section focuses on three important categories: pref-
erence law, the control of managerial discretion during the bankruptcy 
case, and the violation of absolute priority. 
Preference law permits a debtor to recover certain payments made 
61. See, e.g., Raghuram Rajan & Andrew Winton, Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to 
Monitor, 50 J. FIN. 1113 (1995). Security also renders the secured creditor's monitoring more 
effective by giving the creditor leverage over the debtor should it discover the breach of a 
covenant. See Scott, supra note 30, at 1450-51. 
62. See, e.g., Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 
413 (1986) (arguing that covenants restricting investments and disposition of assets are rare and 
trend is toward further reduction); Mitchell Berlin & Jan Loeys, Bond Covenants and Delegated 
Monitoring, 43 J. FIN. 397 (1988). 
63. See Bucldey, supra note 27, at 249. 
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to creditors shortly before filing for bankruptcy.64 This may enhance the 
recovery of creditors as a whole in several ways. First, it may discour-
age a "race to the courthouse" that would destroy the debtor's going 
concern value.65 Second, it may encourage creditors to continue to do 
business with the debtor even though bankruptcy appears possible or 
likely.66 Third, preference law may actually benefit financially troubled 
firms by encouraging creditors to take enforcement actions sooner than 
they otherwise would, thus stimulating corrective action before the firm 
is "too far gone" to be saved.67 Finally, Professor Adler has made a 
persuasive case that preference law, intentionally or not, helps to miti-
gate the overinvestment problem.68 The effects of preference law are 
discussed in conjunction with Deprizio doctrine below.69 
A great deal of effort has gone into addressing the ways in which 
the specific provisions of Chapter 11 control (or fail to control) agency 
confiicts.70 Under Chapter 11, the management of a corporation gener-
64. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1999). 
65. See, e.g., Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 161 (1991) ("By permitting the trustee to 
avoid prebankruptcy transfers that occur within a short period before bankruptcy, creditors are 
discouraged from racing to the courthouse to dismember the debtor during his slide into 
bankruptcy. The protection thus afforded the debtor often enables him to work his way out of a 
difficult financial situation through cooperation with all of his creditors."). 
66. This is closely related to, yet distinct from, the first point. Preference law discourages 
enforcement actions by creditors who might be inclined to try to enforce their rights. By doing so, 
it actually allows other creditors to continue to do business with the debtor with less concern that 
they will be last in line. For this reason, preference law contains exceptions intended to shield 
creditors who continue to engage in ordinary course transactions with the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 547(c)(1)-(5) (1999). 
67. See Triantis & Daniels, supra note 60, at 1094-96. 
68. See Barry E. Adler, A Re-Examination of Near-Bankruptcy Investment Incentives, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 575 (1995). Professor Adler argues that preference law may be more important in 
realigning pre-bankruptcy investment incentives than in fostering an equality between creditors. 
By prohibiting cross-collateralization, it discourages firms from overinvestment. Without 
preference law, shareholders might finance these investments by borrowing from an existing 
creditor, who is induced to make this new secured loan through the offer of security for pre-
existing debt. There is a potential underinvestment problem as well, as firms decline to invest in 
positive NPV opportunities because they must share gains with unsecured creditors. In reality, 
preference law, however, probably does less to aggravate this problem because these may be 
financeable on their own merit, without cross-collateralization. Moreover, Professor Adler 
suggests firms entering into bankruptcy are likely to be poorly managed and so may be more 
likely to have poor NPV options. 
69. See infra Part IlI.A. 
70. See, e.g., Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter 11 Reorganization: Reducing Costs, 
Improving Results, 73 B.U. L. REV. 581 (1993) (arguing that in all Chapter 11 cases, fundamental 
decisions should be made by a trustee rather than by pre-bankruptcy management); Carlos J. 
Cuevas, The Myth of Fiduciary Duties in Corporate Reorganization Cases, 73 NOTRE DAME L. 
REv. 382 (1998) (suggesting that Chapter 11 be amended to permit unsecured creditors to enforce 
the debtor in possession's fiduciary duties); David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts and the Brave 
New World of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 465 [hereinafter Skeel, Markets, Courts]; 
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control: Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the 
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ally retains control during the bankruptcy proceeding.71 At the same 
time, the automatic stay suspends the ability of creditors to use their 
contractual rights to monitor the debtor's management.72 In their place, 
Chapter 11 provides a combination of creditor and judicial oversighC3 
For example, while the debtor's management generally retains the 
authority to make day-to-day decisions, those that are outside the "ordi-
nary course of business" must be approved by the court.74 Chapter 11 
also provides for creditor committees to monitor debtors,75 and if man-
agement is incompetent or dishonest, a trustee can be appointed to take 
control of the debtor or an examiner can be appointed to investigate the 
debtor's affairs.76 These specific provisions are supplemented in a host 
of ways, including the imposition of fiduciary duties on the debtor in 
possession and the constant possibility that the court will end the 
debtor's exclusivity period for filing a plan, lift the automatic stay, or 
convert the case to liquidation under Chapter 7. 
In the end, however, critics remain to be convinced that bankruptcy 
offers an effective mechanism for controlling agency costS.77 It is often 
asserted that management control, however necessary to preserve going 
concern value, results in bankruptcy debtors favoring the interests of 
equity holders over those of creditors (and perhaps favoring the interests 
of management over equity).78 Moreover, the difficulties inherent in 
Bankruptcy Code? (Pts. 1 & 2), 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99 (1983), 57 AM. BANKR. LJ. 247 (1983) 
[hereinafter LoPucki, Debtor in Full Control]. 
71. See 11 U.S.c. §§ 1107, 1108 (1999). 
72. See 11 U.S.c. § 362(a) (1999) (enjoining any actions against the debtor or the debtor's 
property). 
73. See Scott F. Norberg, Debtor Incentives, Agency Costs, and Voting Theory in Chapter II, 
46 U. KAN. L. REv. 507, 526-30 (1998) (discussing mechanisms for oversight and control of the 
debtor in possession). 
74. See 11 U.S.c. § 363(b)-(c) (1999) (providing that the trustee or debtor in possession may 
enter into transactions in the ordinary course of business "without notice or a hearing" and, "after 
notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property 
of the estate"). 
75. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1999). 
76. See II U.S.C. § 1104 (1999). 
77. See. e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 WIS. L. REv. 729 
[hereinafter, LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11] (arguing that Chapter II fails to provide 
appropriate incentives for managers in small business cases and that such cases take too long, and 
proposing reforms). 
78. See. e.g., Norberg, supra note 73, at 509 (stating that the bankruptcy system of controls 
"fails to adequately constrain the [debtor-in-possession's] authority, permitting the DIP to act in 
ways that decrease instead of maximize the value of firm assets"); Lynn M. LoPucki, Chapter 11: 
An Agenda for Basic Reform, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 573, 576-78 (1995) (discussing "excessive 
debtor control" in Chapter 11); Hon. Edith H. Jones, Chapter 11: A Death Penalty for Debtor and 
Creditor Interests, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1088, 1091 (1992) ("The debtor is allowed to run the 
business, and he usually runs it for his own benefit because he does not think he has too much 
time left."). 
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monitoring management in a bankruptcy case are substantially enhanced 
in many small business bankruptcies, where few if any creditors have 
large enough interests to justify taking an active role in monitoring the 
debtor or the bankruptcy proceedings.79 
Finally, various scholars have suggested that the routine violation 
of absolute priority in bankruptcy - that is, the retention of value by 
shareholders even though creditors have not been paid in full - is an 
inducement offered to shareholders to reduce pre bankruptcy agency 
costS.80 For example, Professor Randal Picker suggests that one risk 
facing unsecured creditors is the possibility that a secured creditor will 
foreclose on its collateral and retain its full value, even if the collateral is 
worth more than the debt it secures.8l The problem is that unsecured 
creditors are in a poor position to monitor the value of the collateral, and 
so cannot know if the secured creditor is being enriched at their expense. 
The debtor, which is in a good position to monitor the value of the col-
lateral, has no incentive to do so if the value preserved would go entirely 
to the unsecured creditors. Thus, Professor Picker suggests the violation 
of absolute priority is an inducement offered to the debtor to file for 
bankruptcy and preserve value for the unsecured creditors when there is 
equity in the collateral. It is compensation for protecting the unsecured 
creditors' interests.82 
Similarly, Frierman and Viswanath show that the violation of abso-
lute priority reduces the incentive for overinvestment by permitting 
79. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 44, at 119-20 (noting the collective action problem facing 
small creditors in bankruptcy proceedings); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control -
Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247 (1983); 
Skeel, supra note 70, at 511. 
80. See, e.g., Daigle & Maloney, supra note 35 (suggesting that the violation of absolute 
priority is accepted by bondholders as a means of reducing the incentive of equity holders to 
transfer value to themselves as insolvency approaches); Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante 
Effects of Bankruptcy Refonn on Investment Incentives, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159, 11 77-85 (1994) 
(suggesting that violations of absolute priority should reduce underinvestrnent and asset 
substitution by insolvent firms); William H. Meckling, Financial Markets, Default, and 
Bankruptcy: The Role of the State, 41 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13 (1977); Randal C. Picker, 
Voluntary Petitions and the Creditors' Bargain, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 519 (1992). Others have 
criticized the violation of absolute priority for causing various types of inefficiencies. See, e.g., 
Michelle J. White, Public Policy Toward Bankruptcy: Me-First and Other Priority Rules, II BELL 
J. EcON. & MGMT. 550 (1980); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate 
Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986). Professor Adler has specifically challenged the 
view that violations of absolute priority are inherently superior to contractual resolutions of 
financial agency costs. See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 
439,473-75 (1992); see generally Barry E. Adler, Finance's Theoretical Divide and the Proper 
Role of Insolvency Rules, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1107 (1994) [hereinafter Adler, Theoretical Divide] 
(arguing that contractual arrangements can be designed to accomplish the proposed benefits 
arising from the violation of absolute priority, but at lower cost). 
81. Picker, supra note 80, at 531-46. 
82. See id. 
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shareholders to share in the assets of the firm even if it is insolvent.83 
Others have argued that the violation of absolute priority can reduce the 
underinvestment problem. Consider again Franks and Torous's illustra-
tion, where an insolvent firm rejects a project with a positive net present 
value because the entire benefit would flow to the firm's creditors.84 If 
bankruptcy rules reject the absolute priority rule and reduce the debt to 
$75, thereby allowing shareholders to keep the value in excess of this 
amount even though the creditors have not been repaid in full, the 
investment becomes worthwhile for shareholders. 
Most recently, Professors Posner and Kordana have offered a bar-
gaining model that generalizes these results.85 They note a tension 
between respecting prebankruptcy entitlements and maximizing the 
value of the estate because prebankruptcy entitlements make creditors 
the residual interest holders while Chapter 11 leaves decision making 
power in the hands of managers, who are presumably beholden to 
equity. As they explain the functioning of Chapter 11, the debtor's 
exclusivity period for proposing a plan: (1) gives the debtor the power to 
violate prebankruptcy entitlements, putting the residual value of the firm 
into the hands of equity;86 and, (2) gives management (equity) decision 
making power (through agenda control), thereby reducing bargaining 
costs by concentrating power in one party.87 Thus, decision making and 
residual interest are brought together. Moreover, they are brought 
together under the control of the party who presumably has the most 
information, and so is best able to maximize firm value.88 The cost of 
this efficiency is the rejection of creditors' nonbankruptcy entitlement to 
priority over equity in the event of insolvency. 
As an alternative to the violation of absolute priority, it has been 
suggested that strict adherence to absolute priority, through the auto-
matic cancellation of all equity interests upon default, could be used to 
mitigate financial agency costS.89 Professor Adler has pointed out that 
83. Michael Friennan & P.V. Viswanath, Agency Problems of Debt, Convertible Securities, 
and Deviation from Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy, 37 J.L. & EcON. 455 (1994). 
84. See supra Part IlA. . 
85. Kevin A. Kordana & Eric A. Posner, A Positive Theory of Chapter 11, 74 L. REv. 161 
(1999). 
86. See id. at 187. 
87. See id. 
88. See id. at 188-89. 
89. See Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 
45 STAN. L. REv. 311 (1993) [hereinafter Adler, Financial and Political Theories] (describing a 
contractual structure of "Chameleon Equity" as a possible alternative to bankruptcy law); Skeel, 
supra note 70 (critiquing Adler's proposal); Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 811 
(1994) (responding to Skeel); Adler, Theoretical Divide, supra note 80 (expanding on the idea of 
Chameleon Equity and distinguishing Adler's proposal from that of Bradley and Rosenzweig); 
Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 
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the underinvestment problem could be resolved by provisions in the cor-
porate charter permitting the issuance of limited discount, high-priority 
debt, combined with "chameleon equity."90 Consider once again the 
hypothetical insolvent firm in which the shareholders decline to invest 
$35 to pursue a venture that would return $50. Under Adler's proposal, 
the charter would permit the firm's management to issue $45 of priority 
debt to the old equity holders for a price of $35.91 The $35 in proceeds 
would be used to finance the investment. After the investment is suc-
cessfully completed, the equity holders would receive $45 on their prior-
ity debt, leaving $75 for the firm's creditors - the same resolution 
hypothesized when absolute priority is abandoned.92 The ability of the 
old equity holders to collect on their new, high-priority claim would be 
contingent on the cancellation of their old equity interests.93 New equity 
(worth $75) could then be issued to the old creditors (or a subset of the 
old creditors) in compensation for their claims.94 
Thus, a large number of common law, statutory, and contractual 
rules have been developed to deal with various aspects of financial 
agency costs. As shown in the following section, the insider guaranty is 
properly understood as another tool in this same category. 
III. AGENCY PROBLEMS AND THE INSIDER GUARANTY 
A. The Insider Guaranty as a Solution to Agency Problems 
It is commonly said, both by courts and commentators, that the 
purpose of an insider's95 personal guaranty is to secure an additional 
1043 (1992) (critiquing current Chapter II and proposing that bankruptcy law be amended to 
automatically cancel ~quity interests upon default). 
90. Adler, Theoretical Divide, supra note 80, at 1116-18. This is related to the idea first put 
forward by Jensen and Meckling, then formalized by Richard Green, that the issuance of 
convertible debt can alleviate the overinvestment problem. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 
11, at 354; Richard Green, Investment Incentives, Debt, and Warrants, 13 J. FIN. EeoN. 115 
(1984). But see Frierman & Viswanath, supra note 83 (showing that the improved incentive 
structure created by issuance of convertible debt can be partially defeated if shareholders can trade 
in derivative securities). 
91. Adler, Theoretical Divide, supra note 80, at 1116. 
92. See id. at 1116-17. 
93. See id. at 1117-18. 
94. See id. at 1118. 
95. "Insider" is defined in II U.S.C. § 101(31) (1999) as "including" various parties with 
close relationships to the debtor. In the case of a corporation, for example, insider includes "(i) 
director of the debtor; (ii) officer of the debtor; (iii) person in control of the debtor; (iv) 
partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; (v) general partner of the debtor; or (vi) 
relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor." As the 
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code explains, "An insider is one who has a sufficiently 
close relationship with the debtor that his conduct is made subject to closer scrutiny than those 
dealing at arms length with the debtor." H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) 312, 
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means of repayment should the debtor default on its obligations.96 
While this function (referred to hereafter as "financial assurance") is cer-
tainly one reason for taking a guaranty,97 it is not the only reason, and 
may not even be the predominant one. While it is difficult to gather 
reliable or detailed data on small business financing in general, and on 
personal guaranties in particular,98 we do know a few things that can 
help put a discussion of insider guaranties into context. First, a very 
large number of small business loans are made with personal guaranties. 
According to one recent study, for example, at least 45.7% of small 
business loans, accounting for more than 58.8% of the outstanding dollar 
amount, were personally guarantied in 1993.99 Anecdotal information 
confirms that many commercial lenders seldom extend credit to small 
businesses without a personal guaranty - even if the insider giving the 
guaranty has no net worth. 100 
reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Report of the Comm. of the Judiciary, S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Congo 
2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Congo & Ad. News 5787, 5810. 
96. See. e.g., NCNB Texas Nat'! Bank v. Johnson, II F.3d 1260, 1266 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(stating that permitting the discharge of a debtor to release a guarantor would "defeat the purpose 
of loan guaranties; after all, a lender obtains guaranties specifically to provide an alternative 
source of repayment in the event that the primary obligor's debt is discharged in bankruptcy"); 
R.I.D.C. Ind. Development Fund v. Snyder, 539 F.2d 487, 491 (5th Cir. 1976) cen. denied, 429 
U.S. 1095 (1977) ("One of the principal purposes for obtaining a guarantor to a note is to provide 
an alternative source of repayment in the event that the principal obligor's debt is discharged in 
bankruptcy. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Act provides that discharge in bankruptcy will not alter 
the liability of a guarantor." (footnote omitted». 
97. Indeed, there is a growing economic literature on the value and functions of guaranties 
given by third parties as further assurance of repayment. This is an area of the economy that has 
seen explosive growth in recent decades in areas such as SBA loan guaranties, mortgage 
insurance, default insurance on corporate or municipal bonds, and interest rate swaps. The 
functions of these types of contracts are far removed from those of insider guaranties. For more 
on the role of these financial, rather than control, guaranties, see generally, Van Son Lai, An 
Analysis of Private Loan Guarantees, 6 J.FIN. SER. REs. 223 (1992); T.S. Campbell, On the 
Optimal Regulation of Financial Guarantees, I J. REAL. EST. FIN. & EcON. 61 (1988); B. Hirtle, 
The Growth of the Financial Guarantee Market, FED. REs. BANK OF NEW YORK QUARTERLY 
REVIEW 10 (Spring 1987); William C. Hunter, Insurance. Incentives. and Efficiency in Small 
Business Lending, 50 SOUTIlERN EcoN. J. 1171 (1984). 
98. As recently stated in one of the few empirical studies of personal guaranties, "[T]he 
academic literature on the role of personal collateral and guarantees in small business finance is 
limited, in part because few data sets include sufficient information to permit a thorough study." 
Robert B. Avery, et aI., The Role of Personal Wealth in Small Business Finance, 22 J. BANKING & 
FIN. 1019, 1020 (1998). 
99. See id. at 1052. These totals include loans which are guarantied. secured by personal 
assets. or both. Due to limitations in the data available. certain loans that are likely to have been 
personally guarantied or secured by personal assets were assumed not to have been, so these 
numbers likely underestimate the extent of personal liability for small business debt. See id. at 
1031-34. Offsetting this. 62.6% of loans with personal guaranties, and 36% of loans for which 
personal assets were pledged but no personal guaranty was provided, were also secured by 
corporate asset~. See id. at 1052. 
100. See id. at 1058 (reporting no consistent relationship between the use of personal 
guaranties and owner wealth); see also Mann, supra note 9, at 24 n.86. 
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The reason for taking a guaranty from a party who is likely to be 
judgment proof is no mystery. The goal is to obtain leverage over the 
firm's decisions. This fact has often been noted in the literature and case 
law, usually with disapprova1. 101 The consensus view seems to be that 
this type of leverage is objectionable, that lenders seek it in order to 
obtain an unfair position vis-a-vis the debtor and its other creditors. It is 
true that lenders can use the leverage from an insider guaranty to obtain 
preferential treatment relative to other creditors,102 but this is not the 
only reason for seeking leverage through an insider guaranty, and the 
proper treatment of these instruments requires an acknowledgment of 
the positive functions of leverage. 
As shown in the previous section, fiduciary duties, collateral and 
covenants, and various bankruptcy rules are all used to alleviate the 
agency costs that grow increasingly severe as a firm heads towards 
insolvency. These devices are used with both public and private firms, 
but they are clearly less effective with private firms. Secured credit may 
be useful if the borrower has assets to pledge, but not all small firms 
have significant assets to offer. 103 Loan covenants may lose much of 
their effectiveness because they depend on monitoring by the creditor, 
which may not be worthwhile on relatively small loans. Moreover, in 
public companies, the ability to displace management and/or to shift 
management powers from one class of claim holders to another can pro-
vide creditors with significant leverage. 104 In private companies, the 
knowledge and management abilities of insiders may be crucial to the 
value of the firm, and so displacement is not a viable threat. Thus, in the 
small firm context, creditors need some other way to ensure that insiders 
manage the firm in a value-maximizing way even as the firm 
101. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Clear Thinking About Insider Preferences, 77 MINN. 
L. REv. 1393, 1395-96 (1993) [hereinafter Westbrook, Clear Thinking] ("The leverage guaranty 
has only the illegitimate purpose of providing leverage for a lender preference."); Nussbaum, 
supra note 9, at 614 ("In short, Bank's 'prudence' in obtaining the guarantee will often be a thinly 
cloaked pursuit of a preference, and giving absolute protection to Bank merely encourages self-
interested conduct by Insider."); Diane Stehle Dix, Note, Avoidable Preferences in Bankruptcy: 
The Status of the Insider Guarantee in the Wake of Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp. (In re 
V.N. Deprizio Construction Co.), 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989),60 U. CIN. L. REv. 1363, 1388-
89 (''To give absolute protection to the creditor [from the Deprizio doctrine] would simply 
encourage self-dealing and lead to abuse of power by enabling the creditor to insist on a guarantee 
to be used solely to pressure the debtor in making preferential payments, without regard to the 
debtor's interest in preserving its integrity and paying its other creditors."). 
102. See infra Part 1lI.A. 
103. Thus, Avery, finds that firms with few tangible assets that can be pledged as security are 
more likely to offer lenders personal guaranties from their shareholders. Avery et aI., supra note 
98, at 1049. 
104. See Buckley, supra note 27, at 249-50. 
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approaches, or has entered, insolvency. This is the role of the insider 
guaranty. 
The insider guaranty reduces the costs of financial agency in a 
number of important ways. First, it may provide an important signal 
about the quality of the firm, reducing the cost of evaluating loan appli-
cations and improving the quality of the decisions made. Second, the 
threat of personal liability mitigates the perverse incentives that nor-
mally affect shareholder/creditor relations in insolvency. It provides an 
additional incentive for the guarantor to strive to save the debtor should 
the firm get into financial trouble and encourages the guarantor to make 
efficient decisions regarding investment policies and bankruptcy initia-
tion. Third, even after the guarantor pays on the guaranty, subrogation 
or reimbursement rights place the guarantor in a position where its 
incentives continue to be closely aligned with those of the firm's 
creditors. 
Thus, the first major function of the insider guaranty is as an infor-
mational and screening device.105 The logic is simple enough: a poten-
tial lender knows that the borrower has more information about its 
prospects than does the lender, and thus fears that important risks may 
be concealed. Verbal assurances obviously can do little to assuage this 
concern, and verification efforts (such as a detailed audit of the business) 
are both fallible and expensive. An insider's agreement to put personal 
assets at risk, however, is a strong signal that the insider believes the 
firm will be able to repay. 106 Thus, the insider guaranty reduces the cost 
of the loan approval process and helps lenders avoid high risk borrow-
ers. This, in tum, lowers default rates and allows lenders to make small 
business loans less expensive. 107 
105. See, Avery et aI., supra note 98, at 1022, 1024 (noting the value of the insider guaranty as 
a screening device that mitigates adverse selection risks); Barry L. Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays in 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 213, 239 (same). Cf F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy 
Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REv. 1393 (1986) (discussing the screening function of secured credit); 
Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When 
Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. EcON. 187 (1984) (arguing that 
secured credit arrangements reduce information costs). 
106. See Stephen A. Ross, The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive Signaling 
Approach, 8 BELL J. OF EcON. 23 (l977) (demonstrating that an incentive structure that will 
penalize managers upon filing of bankruptcy can communicate nonobservable information to 
investors). Note that the value of the signal does not necessarily depend on what the lender may 
be able to recover from the insider should it ever sue on the guaranty, if the lender can inflict costs 
on the insider through such a suit. The "in terrorem" effect of being able to foreclose on assets of 
high personal value even if they have low market value, or of forCing the insider into bankruptcy 
gi ves credence to the signal even if it does little to provide additional assets to repay the lender 
upon the borrower's default. Cf Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor 
Remedies, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 730 (1989) (noting the potential efficiency of signaling by granting 
security interests in low value household goods). 
107. See Katz, supra note 5, at 66, 68. 
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Consider next the way the insider guaranty can mitigate perverse 
prebankruptcy incentives, such as the incentive to delay bankruptcy in 
the futile hope of turning around a failing company, or the incentive to 
file an inefficient bankruptcy in order to extract concessions from lend-
ers. An insider guarantor knows that dissipation of the estate will 
increase her liability on the guaranty, and the guarantor's position as 
insider presumably gives her the ability to cause a bankruptcy filing. 108 
Thus, to the extent that the decision to file for bankruptcy represents a 
choice between shareholder, manager and creditor interests, an insider 
guaranty becomes a means of encouraging efficient bankruptcy filings 
and discouraging inefficient ones. 109 
A great deal of attention has been directed to Professor Adler's sug-
gestion that the costs of financial distress could be reduced by the crea-
tion of "Chameleon Equity."llo A firm could create a capital structure 
that is essentially a tiered hierarchy of preferred equity, in which classes 
would have collection rights, but no individual creditor would be able to 
enforce its claim against the firm. III Default would result in the elimi-
nation of the existing common stock and the conversion of the lowest 
tier of "debt" into new common stock. I 12 This system would eliminate 
the risk of inefficient dismemberment through a creditors' race to levy 
against the firm, thus satisfying one of the primary functions of bank-
ruptcy. I J3 In addition, by eliminating the bankruptcy proceeding itself, 
Chameleon Equity would eliminate the costs of conflicting incentives 
during the bankruptcy case. 
While Chameleon Equity is an interesting theoretical possibility, 
various factors prevent firms from creating such interests today. I 14 An 
insider guaranty, however, accomplishes essentially the same thing as 
Chameleon Equity, but far more simply. JI5 Consider the underinvest-
108. See id. at 70-71 (noting that a controlling shareholder is the residual claimant and can 
monitor and police debtor misconduct, and so is well positioned to guarantee firm debt). 
109. In 1997, Dun & Bradstreet reported that 83,384 businesses closed down without paying 
their creditors in full. See Business Failures Rise for the First Time in Three Years, Business 
Wire, March 2, 1998. There were, however, only 10,092 business Chapter II filings and 31,862 
business Chapter 7 filings. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL 
TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, table F-2. Thus, no more than half of the business failures 
in 1997 were administered through the bankruptcy courts. 
110. See Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 89 (proposing chameleon equity); 
Adler, A World Without Debt, supra note 89 (responding to critics); Adler, Theoretical Divide, 
supra note 80 (expanding on the idea of chameleon equity and responding to critics). 
111. See Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 89, at 323-33. 
ll2. [d.; Adler, Theoretical Divide, supra note 80, at ll18. 
113. Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 89, at 323-24. 
ll4. See Adler, Theoretical Divide, supra note 80, at ll29-31; Adler, Financial and Political 
Theories, supra note 89, at 333-41. 
115. That is not to say that other contractual arrangements may not be used to align 
management interests with the interests of creditors when a firm is insolvent. See Gilson & 
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ment hypothetical presented in Part II.A., supra, in which shareholders 
of an insolvent firm saw no reason to invest $35 in a project that would 
return $50. Now assume the firm's debt is guarantied by its sole share-
holder. Without the new investment, the shareholder is liable for a $30 
deficiency ($100 in debt less $70 in assets). If the investment is made, 
this liability drops to $15 ($100 in debt, less $70 in existing assets and 
$15 net profit from the new investment). The insider guaranty presents 
a simple contractual solution to the underinvestment problem by making 
the insider the firm's residual claimant until the guarantied debt is 
repaid. 116 Successful investments by the borrower will increase the 
amount of the debt the borrower can repay, thus reducing the insider's 
liability on its guaranty. 117 
The guaranty also bonds the insider to work for the rehabilitation of 
the debtor should it fallon hard times, rather than abandoning the enter-
prise. Particularly in businesses where individual knowledge and effort 
are key assets, an owner who does not face the prospect of personal 
liability may be tempted to use his or her human capital and goodwill to 
start a new enterprise in the same line of business, free from the debts 
incurred by the prior, failed enterprise. While a personal guaranty can-
not ensure that the proprietor will not follow this path (at least as long as 
personal bankruptcy remains an option for discharging the personal lia-
bility), it does reduce the possibility by limiting the insider's ability to 
retain personal capital with which to start the new business. 
Similarly, the risk of dissipation or misappropriation of the firm's 
assets is lessened. With bankruptcy approaching, shareholders may seek 
to extract value from the company through dividends, the repayment of 
insider debt, or fraudulent transfers. I 18 An insider guaranty reduces the 
guarantor's incentive to drain the firm in these ways, and also encour-
ages the guarantor to prevent such behavior by other insiders who may 
not have joined in the guaranty.119 
In the same way, insider guaranties may reduce the risk of ineffi-
Vetsuypens, supra note 49, at 1015-19 (reporting on companies that tied executive compensation 
to creditor recoveries as part of debt restructuring plans both inside and outside of bankruptcy). 
116. Moreover, this may negate the basic justification for shifting fiduciary duties to the 
creditors upon insolvency. If the equity holder continues to be the residual claimant, the directors' 
and/or managers' fiduciary duties should continue to run to the equity holders. 
117. Equivalently, if the insider has already been forced to pay on his guaranty, he gains rights 
against the borrower by subrogation or indemnification. Any increase in the borrower's assets 
will increase the insider's recovery on these claims. 
118. See Lin, supra note 49, at 1494. Cases have held that the use of a corporation's funds to 
pay guarantied debt can be a breach of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., South Falls Corp. v. Rochelle, 
329 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1964); In re Holly Hill Medical Center, Inc. 53 B.R. 412 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
1985); In re Ozark Restaurant Equipment Co., Inc., 41 B.R. 476 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1984). 
119. See Katz, supra note 5, at 73-74. 
522 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LA W REVIEW [Vol. 54:497 
cient dismemberment of the firm through a "race to the courthouse." 
Suppose there is a firm with $100 in debt, and assets that are worth $80 
as a going concern but only $70 if they are split up and sold piecemeal. 
Shareholders have no stake in whether the firm is dismembered or not; 
either way, there is no value for equity.120 An insider guarantor, on the 
other hand, has an incentive to resist a value-reducing dismember-
ment. \21 In this way, the insider guaranty may reinforce the goals of 
preference law by motivating insiders to resist inefficient creditor 
pressures. 122 
The insider guaranty may mitigate the race to the courthouse in a 
second way. It reassures the guarantied creditors that the manager is 
interested (due to his residual liability) in maximizing the creditors' 
recoveries. A creditor is likely to feel substantially less need to close 
down the debtor if it is confident that the firm is being managed to maxi-
mize the creditor's well-being, rather than the well-being of equity hold-
ers.123 Indeed, this appears to be a primary reason commercial lenders 
take insider guaranties: They do not expect to foreclose on their collat-
eral or force a bankruptcy filing upon default. 124 They want to leave the 
firm in the borrower's hands, because the borrower should best be able 
to maximize the value of its assets.125 To do this, however, the creditor 
needs some assurance that the borrower will try to maximize the value 
120. They may resist dismemberment in order to preserve their jobs or extend the option 
represented by their equity interests. 
121. Note that the guarantor will not resist a value-maximizing dismemberment because 
resisting would increase liability. 
122. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Two Thoughts About Insider Preferences, 76 MINN. L. 
REv. 73, 85 (1991) [hereinafter Westbrook, Two Thoughts]. 
123. An insider guaranty may further increase the ability of the firm to resolve problems 
without dismemberment or bankruptcy, if paired with a blanket lien on the firm's assets. Apart 
from the primary creditor, there is little incentive for creditors to pursue the debtor, since all of its 
assets are encumbered. Thus, the threat of dismemberment is remote, and, with the collective 
action problem thereby minimized, the equity holders and the primary creditor can negotiate 
toward an efficient resolution. In other words, the combination of "all asset" financing with an 
insider guaranty may provide the primary benefits of a bankruptcy reorganization scheme (staying 
enforcement by creditors, while permitting the firm to maximize its asset values) without the need 
for a bankruptcy filing. Cf Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative 
Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 311 (1991). 
124. See generally Mann, supra note 9 (arguing that foreclosure often results in losses for the 
lender, but the threat of foreclosure is used to induce borrowers to resolve the lending situation 
efficiently); Westbrook, Two Thoughts, supra note 122, at 84 n.46. 
125. This is consistent with the argument, advanced by Professor Bowers, that small business 
debtors are normally able to liquidate their enterprises more efficiently than courts or creditors. 
See James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy Theory 
and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2097 (1990); James W. Bowers, 
Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and the Elementary Economics 
of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REv. 27 (1991). 
2000] INSIDER GUARANTIES IN BANKRUPTCY 523 
of the business for application to the debt. This assurance is provided by 
the personal guaranty. 
It is worth noting that these beneficial incentive alignment effects 
exist prior to payment of the debt by either the guarantor or borrower, 
because the guarantor is concerned with minimizing its personal liabil-
ity. It also exists after repayment of the debt by the guarantor assuming 
the guarantor has the right to reimbursement or subrogation to the credi-
tor's claim, because the insider will want to maximize his recovery from 
the debtor. 126 In such a situation, the insider shares with other creditors 
in the assets of the estate and thus will want to maximize the payout to 
creditors. 
The insider guaranty is no panacea, of course. First of all, it does 
not fully correct inefficient incentives unless the insider has guarantied 
all of the firm's debts, because the insider is not the sole residual claim-
ant. He must share any profits or benefits with other creditors, and thus 
still faces some level of inappropriate incentives. 127 The beneficial 
incentive effects of insider guaranties can be further defeated or miti-
gated in several ways that are worth noting. First, there is the possibility 
that the guarantor will be judgment proof, or have a net worth so limited 
as to render the threat of deficiency liability insignificant. Second, it is 
always possible, particularly in the case of a small business failure, that 
the guarantor will go into bankruptcy and discharge the guaranty obliga-
tion. An insider guaranty will also lose its effectiveness if the guarantied 
creditor is able to secure repayment of its debt from the borrower prior 
to the preference period. That is, if a creditor can use its leverage over 
the insider to secure repayment from the company, the guaranty will 
126. Absent an express waiver, a guarantor has a right to reimbursement from the borrower for 
any amounts paid under the guaranty. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY 
§§ 22-25 (1995). If the guarantor satisfied the claim owed to the creditor, the guarantor also 
becomes subrogated to the creditor's rights against the borrower. See id. at §§ 27-3l. 
127. For example, return again to the overinvestment hypothetical presented in Part ILA. The 
shareholders of a firm with $70 in assets and $100 in debt choose to invest $30 in a project with a 
10% chance of returning $200 and a 90% of returning nothing - even though the investment has 
a negative net present value. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35. A solvent shareholder/ 
guarantor would reject this investment in order to reduce its expected personal liability. If the 
investment is made, the shareholder/guarantor's position has an expected value of negative $40: 
an expected guaranty liability of (10% x $0) + (90% x $60) = $54, partially offset by an equity 
value of (10% x $140) + (90% x $0) = $14. If the investment is not made, the guarantor faces 
liability of $30. 
Suppose, however, that the shareholder had guarantied just half of the firm's debt. If the 
investment is not made, the shareholder's position is worth negative $15 (no equity value, liability 
for fifty percent of the $30 in unpaid debt). If the investment is made, the shareholder's position 
is worth $14 in equity value less an expected guaranty liability of (10% x 0 ) + (90% x $30) = $27, 
for a total value of negative $13. Thus, the investment improves the guarantor's position despite 
the partial guaranty of the firm's debt, although not by as much as when the debt was 
unguarantied. 
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have accomplished its immediate purpose from the perspective of the 
lender, but the elimination of the insider's contingent creditor status will 
also destroy the beneficial incentive effects discussed above. Issues 
raised by these limitations are addressed in various sections below. 
B. Insider Guaranties versus Other Control Devices 
Light may be shed on the appropriate treatment of insider guaran-
ties by exploring the similarities of an insider guaranty to a security 
interest; the analogy is much closer than is often acknowledged. 128 This 
comparison is presented below, following a brief comparison of insider 
guaranties with the two other primary methods of controlling the share-
holder/creditor conflict, fiduciary duties and loan covenants. 
As described above,129 fiduciary duties may offer a partial solution 
to financial agency problems, but fiduciary duties are a very blunt 
tool. 130 First, of course, the business judgment rule presents an impor-
tant barrier to suits for breach of the duty of care in all but the most 
egregious cases. 131 Even beyond the practical problems, however, fidu-
ciary duties are poorly calibrated. Directors owe their fiduciary duties to 
the shareholders until the firm is "in the vicinity of insolvency" (when-
ever that is), when those duties suddenly shift to include the firm's cred-
itors. But the perverse incentives faced by shareholders and managers 
do not suddenly appear; they vary smoothly, with incentives shifting 
proportionately as the firm's fortunes wax and wane.132 A dichotomous 
regime of fiduciary duties owed to one set of claim holders or another 
cannot easily accommodate these gradations. The incentive effects of 
the guaranty, however, vary directly with the magnitude of the agency 
problem. As a firm gets nearer to insolvency, the probability and likely 
amount of guaranty liability increase, making the insider-guarantor more 
like a creditor and less like a shareholder. In other words, as the agency 
problem grows, so does the countervailing effect of the guaranty. This 
128. Professor Mann has commented on the similarities of secured credit and insider 
guaranties. See, Mann, supra note 9, at 10. For an analogy between the two in the context of co-
debtor stays, see Zaretsky, supra note 105, at 233. 
129. See supra Part I.B.1. 
130. See, e.g.. Ramesh K.S. Rao, et aI., Fiduciary Duty a La Lyonnais: An Economic 
Perspective on Corporate Governance in a Financially-Distressed Firm, 22 I. CORP. L. 53, 63-64 
(l996) (noting the difficulty of determining when a firm is in "the vicinity of insolvency" and 
director's duties should shift). 
131. See supra text accompanying note 50. 
132. This was recognized in Credit Lyonnaise and resulted in the court's holding that "at least 
where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely 
the agent of the residue [sic] risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise." Credit 
Lyonnaise Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 LEXIS 215, at *83 (Del. 
Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in identifying the "vicinity of 
insolvency," see Barondes, supra note 35, at 71-72. 
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makes the guaranty a much more finely tuned instrument than the law's 
default regime of fiduciary duties. 
Next, compare the insider guaranty with loan covenants. The effec-
tiveness of loan covenants in mitigating agency problems depends 
directly on the ability of the parties to specify in the loan documents, in 
an enforceable way, the behavior that is permitted or prohibited. 133 For 
various types of potential misbehavior, this may prove impossible. 134 
And to the extent that the loan documents do provide specific standards 
against which to measure the debtor's activity (or prescribe a general 
norm such as "good faith"), the parties will be faced with the costs of 
monitoring the debtor for compliance, bringing an enforcement action 
should violations be detected, and hoping that the court can arrive at an 
accurate determination.135 The insider guaranty, in contrast, gradually 
realigns the incentives faced by management without the need for any 
legal action by the creditor, thus minimizing monitoring, enforcement 
and error costS.136 
Finally, consider the insider guaranty as compared with secured 
credit. As discussed above, secured credit is a means of controlling vari-
ous agency problems.137 Although there are a number of plausible 
explanations for the ways in which security works, collateral reduces 
agency costs in large part by disabling the borrower from engaging in 
many actions without the consent ofthe secured creditor. Consequently, 
security interests sometimes prevent the borrower from engaging in 
desirable acts, preventing efficient investments by the borrower. 138 
Insider guaranties do not create inefficient restrictions of this sort. 
Security may also be a method borrowers and secured creditors use 
to appropriate value from other creditors. 139 Whether or not this redistri-
133. See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 27, at 270-77. 
134. See Clifford w. Smith & Jerrold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of 
Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. EcON. 117, 153 (1970). 
135. See Buckley, supra note 27, at 256 (noting that types of enforcement actions and costs 
that may be required of creditors relying on loan provisions to replace wayward management). 
136. In this sense, the insider guaranty is similar to an ipso facto clause, a provision that makes 
filing for bankruptcy an event of default. Unlike most other loan covenants, which proscribe 
specific actions, an ipso facto clause "relies on a rough but easily determined, surrogate for 
increased riskiness. As such, an ipso facto clause performs a general function that could not be 
done as well by another, more specific, contract term." Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-
Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 851, 889-90 (1982). 
137. See supra Part 1.B.2. 
138. See, e.g., Smith & Warner, supra note 134, at 128; Scott, supra note 30, at 1452. 
139. Even if secured credit is an efficient institution overall, it may reallocate value as between 
the debtor its secured creditor and its unsecured creditors. As an unsecured creditor, you are at 
risk that the debtor will grant a security interest, thereby reducing the expected recovery on your 
claim. Indeed, this ability to redistribute value away from unsecured creditors may induce debtors 
to borrow on a secured basis even where the granting of collateral is inefficient. See Lucian Arye 
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bution is unfair,140 it may induce the parties to enter into economically 
inefficient secured transactions. 141 That is, the use of security may 
engender greater total costs than benefits but, because some of the costs 
are externalized onto nonadjusting creditors, the firm and lender use 
security anyway. 
The same can be said for insider guaranties. They may alleviate 
various agency problems, but they may also redistribute value from 
nonadjusting creditors to the guarantied lender if the guarantied creditor 
can use its additional leverage to improve its treatment. Yet unsecured 
creditors are fully aware of this risk,142 and from the perspective of the 
typical unsecured creditor, an insider guaranty is far less threatening 
than the granting of security. After all, a guaranty does not give the 
lender an automatic preferred position with respect to any of the debtor's 
assets, as a security interest does. Moreover, a guaranty may increase 
the total assets available to settle the debtor's claims by bringing in the 
guarantor's assets (at least where the guarantor has waived its right to 
reimbursement from the debtor143 or where the guarantor will be reim-
bursed only in part due to the debtor's insolvency). Creditors may fur-
ther benefit because the guarantor's right to reimbursement provides an 
incentive to maximize the payout to the creditor class to which he or she 
belongs. 144 
If insider guaranties are functionally close to security interests, we 
Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 
105 YALE LJ. 857, 895-902 (1995). 
140. This redistribution is not unfair to the extent that the creditors who lose out are aware of 
their risk and can on average charge a price for their credit that fully compensates them. See 
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 53, at 1300-03; cf Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re Deprizio 
Constr. Corp.), 874 F.2d 1186, 1198 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Rules of law affecting parties to voluntary 
arrangements do not operate 'inequitably' in the business world" because parties will adjust the 
price of credit to reflect the effects of the rule). On the other hand, various creditors may be 
unable to adjust the "price" they charge the firm for "credit" such as tort creditors, and this 
redistribution is arguably unfair as to these nonadjusting creditors. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra 
note 53, at 1304-07, 1313-14. 
141. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 53, at 1304-21. 
142. Indeed, as early as 1848, one state supreme court refused to condemn insider preferences 
on exactly these grounds: ''The stockholder and the stranger, who are both creditors of a 
corporation, no doubt stand in very unequal positions. But it is an inequality which the law 
allows, and which is understood by those who contract with corporations, and one which will 
always tend, more or less, to bring in doubt the credit of such bodies." Whitewell v. Warner, 20 
Vt. 425, 444-45 (l848) (quoted in John C. McCoid, Corporate Preferences to Insiders, 43 S.C. L. 
REv. 805, 820 (1992». 
143. On the use of such waivers, see infra Part IV.A. 
144. The firm's general unsecured creditors clearly would prefer the existence of guarantied 
unsecured debt over secured debt, because a secured creditor is guarantied repayment up to the 
value of its collateral and has a reduced incentive to monitor the debtor. They also may prefer that 
the firm's primary creditor holds guarantied unsecured debt, rather than unguarantied unsecured 
debt, if the increases in efficiency outweigh the risk of preferential treatment. 
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might expect similar rules to apply to each. Consider the differences in 
legal doctrine, however. Three crucial distinctions can be drawn 
between secured credit and an insider guaranty. First, secured credit is 
accorded its prior rights only if it has been recorded, and so, it may be 
argued, unsecured creditors are on notice. No similar recording is either 
required or provided for with guaranties. Second, the secured creditor 
obtains a well-defined priority in particular assets, while an insider guar-
anty merely increases the lender's leverage. This arguably results in 
greater uncertainty for other creditors as to the effects of the guaranty 
compared to the effects of security.145 Finally, a distinction can be and 
often is drawn between the "property rights" conveyed by a security 
interest as opposed to the mere "contract rights" created by a 
guaranty. 146 
The results of these distinctions appear in the different ways secur-
ity and suretyship are conceptualized temporally. That is, the transfer of 
a property interest in the collateral is thought of as occurring when the 
security interest is perfected, rather than when the leverage created by 
the security interest is used to obtain a payment from the borrower. 
Thus, the "transfer" often occurs long before the debtor gets into finan-
cial trouble. This protects payments made near bankruptcy from being 
considered preferentiaU47 In the case of the guaranty, the transfer is 
viewed as occurring when the payment is made, thus subjecting pay-
ments shortly before bankruptcy to preference law. This is a purely 
arbitrary conclusion, however. 148 Conceptually, the guaranty could be 
145. Too much could be made of this argument because secured creditors do not simply 
foreclose when the finn gets into financial trouble. They use the leverage provided by the threat 
of foreclosure to influence finn decision making - the same way a lender can use an insider 
guaranty. 
146. The limits of this distinction are pointed out by Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, 
Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on 
Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 97, 112, 114 (1984) 
(stating that security provides the lender with property rights in specific assets, but also noting that 
"the property right ... is principally a means to an end - priority as against third parties with 
regard to payment. ... The probability of repayment and not any intrinsic interest in the collateral 
itself is the principal element of the value of his bargain with the debtor"). This same insight is 
recognized in mortgage law through the "lien theory" of mortgages: that even though a mortgage 
may purport to transfer title to the collateral to the lender, the property right received by the lender 
is simply title as security for repayment of the debt. For a discussion and critique of the thesis that 
the fifth amendment protects the property rights of secured creditors, see James Steven Rogers, 
The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization: A Study Of The Relationship 
Between The Fifth Amendment And The Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REv. 973 (1983). 
147. A payment can be avoided as a preference under the Bankruptcy Code only if it is made 
within 90 days of the bankruptcy filing, or within one year of the filing if it is made to or for the 
benefit of a creditor who is an insider. See II U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1999). 
148. The arbitrary nature of this determination is well shown by comparison with the treatment 
of standby letters of credit, which are in many ways a substitute for a guaranty. When a bank 
issues a letter of credit on the borrower's behalf for the benefit of a lender and the lender later 
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viewed the same way as a security agreement: at the initiation of the 
debtor-creditor relationship, the debtor grants the lender a mechanism 
for increased leverage to obtain repayment should the debtor get into 
financial trouble in the future. 
Under current law, the problem with this perspective is one of 
notice. Because of the way secured credit has been conceptualized, a 
mechanism has been provided for giving notice of security interests to 
third parties, and a security interest is only valid as against those third 
parties if notice has been provided. The law, however, has neither 
required nor created a mechanism to provide notice of guaranties, so 
other creditors have no easy way of knowing that a lender has obtained 
the leverage of an insider guaranty. Yet this distinction between secured 
credit and guaranties is less convincing on closer examination of the 
way notice operates with secured credit: after all, a secured creditor does 
not have priority in its collateral only as to subsequent unsecured credi-
tors, who knew or could have known of its lien. It also has priority over 
prior unsecured creditors, a result defended with the observation that 
these creditors were on notice that the borrower might grant subsequent 
security interests. In the same way, however, creditors of a closely-held 
firm are on "notice" that insiders may guaranty firm obligations, provid-
ing leverage to the guarantied creditor. 
To the extent that insider guaranties and security interests appear to 
serve similar functions, it would seem that the treatment of secured 
credit, which has been closely studied, should provide some guidance in 
thinking about the appropriate treatment of insider guaranties - despite 
the seemingly arbitrary differences in legal categorization that could lead 
to inconsistent treatment. 149 
To summarize, then, insider guaranties are an important device for 
limiting financial agency costs. They are bonding devices that help 
ensure that managers carry out the firm's bargain with its lenders, thus 
reducing the total cost of capital. Moreover, the insider guaranty has an 
advantage over other monitoring and policing devices because it works 
in a fundamentally different way. Controlling a borrower through collat-
eral may require the imposition of restrictions that will tum out to be too 
draws down the letter of credit to recover on its debt, the transfer to the lender is deemed to have 
occurred upon the issuance of the letter of credit, rather than upon the payment under it. See, e.g., 
Perlstein v. Lamber Coal Co. (In re AOV Ind., Inc.), 64 B.R. 933 (Bankr. D. D.C. 1986); Briggs 
Transp. Co. v. Norwest Bank (In re Briggs Transp. Co.), 37 B.R. 76 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984). 
149. This view informs the discussions of the law in Part IV, infra, but it is of even greater 
importance in analyzing the validity of bankruptcy court injunctions against the enforcement of 
insider guaranties. While I address this matter to some extent in Part IV.B., infra, discussing 
springing and exploding guaranties, the broader issue deserves more detailed attention than it can 
be given in this article. 
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tight, barring efficient investments or requiring expensive renegotia-
tions. Relying on covenants or fiduciary duties requires constant vigi-
lance by the lender because breaches must be identified and enforcement 
actions brought. Thus, these devices entail substantial monitoring and 
enforcement costs (in addition to the error costs of flawed judicial 
decisions). 
The insider guaranty, in contrast, minimizes costs by changing the 
decisionmaker's incentives, thereby reducing the desirability of misbe-
havior without barring any specific course of conduct. 150 Enforcement 
is relatively inexpensive, because a guaranty suit requires no proof that a 
condition or legal duty has been violated. All that a plaintiff must show 
is that the borrower failed to make a payment when due. It is this 
remarkable economy, not the leverage to induce wrongful preferential 
conduct, that most likely accounts for the Ubiquity of insider guaranties. 
To the extent that this benefits the firm, all of the parties with stakes in 
the firm - including the creditors who do not hold guaranties - should 
be better off. 
This does leave a lingering mystery, however. Insider guaranties 
should often help to prevent inefficient prebankruptcy behavior and 
should reduce the number of inappropriate bankruptcy filings, yet 
observers seem to agree that small business reorganization cases are 
often filed when there is little or no hope of success, and that these cases 
often drag on beyond any reasonable limits of time and expense. 151 If 
insider guaranties are so effective in aligning shareholder and creditor 
incentives, and if they are so universally used, then why is the small 
business bankruptcy system perceived as so ineffective? The answer 
lies, I believe, in exploring when a bankruptcy case will be filed despite 
the existence of an insider guaranty, and the effects of the guaranty on 
the path of the bankruptcy case. 
C. Insider Guaranties and Bankruptcy Negotiation 
If there is a recurring theme in commentary on small business reor-
ganization cases, it is that they take too long, cost too much, and are 
150. Cf. ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 126-32 (1991) (noting !he efficiency of 
inculcated norms, compared to external monitoring and enforcement, in inducing desirable 
behavior). 
151. Thus, !he National Bankruptcy Review Commission could refer to "two distinct 
categories of small business Chapter 11 cases. . . . The first category consists of !he relatively 
small proportion of cases in which !he debtor has a reasonable likelihood of confirming a plan and 
succeeding as a going business ... The second category consists of the much larger proportion of 
cases in which !he debtor has no reasonable prospect of rehabilitation." NATIONAL BANKR. 
REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 609 (1997). 
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often unworthy of the effort.152 Indeed, the data clearly show that large 
firms are far more likely than small firms to succeed in reorganiza-
tion.153 If insider guaranties are so common in the small firm setting, 
and if they provide appropriate incentives in insolvency, why should 
small business bankruptcies seem so dissatisfactory in practice? The 
answer lies at least partly in the selection effects created by insider 
guaranties. 
Rationally, we can expect small businesses to file for bankruptcy, 
despite the existence of an insider guaranty, in either of two basic cir-
cumstances. First, where the reorganization is expected to be value 
maximizing, the insider will cause the firm to file in order to minimize 
his guaranty liability. 154 Second, if the insider is insolvent, the guaranty 
will have little deterrent effect and the insider may file an inefficient 
case despite the likelihood of increased liability on the guaranty. 155 
This covers the relationship between the insider guaranty and bank-
ruptcy initiation from a rational perspective, but the irrational, emotional 
aspect also merits attention. It has often been noted that financially dis-
tressed debtors may cling to any straw of hope, and legal rules are 
imposed in a number of contexts to protect debtors from unrealistic 
dreams of financial recovery. 156 This failing is also observed in the 
world of bankruptcy. A distressed business may file for Chapter 11 
reorganization not because recovery is probable, or even possible, but 
because the owner is unwilling to face the economic realities - and the 
152. See, e.g., LoPucki, The Trouble With Chapter II, supra note 77. For an examination of 
the direct costs of small business bankruptcy cases, see generally Robert M. Lawless, et aI., A 
Glimpse of Professional Fees and Other Direct Costs in Small Firm Bankruptcies, 1994 U. ILL. L. 
REv. 847 (showing direct costs in excess of 26% of the distributions made to unsecured creditors). 
For a discussion of the total costs of bankruptcy relative to their benefits, see Marshall E. Tracht, 
Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling Theory, Practice, and Law, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 
301, 321-26 (1997) [hereinafter Tracht, Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers]. 
153. In one study of public companies in bankruptcy, for example, more than 90% of debtors 
confirmed reorganization plans. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over 
Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. 
L. REV. 125, 137-41 (1990). In contrast, a study of 260 Chapter 11 cases found that just forty-five 
resulted in confirmed plans, nine of which called for liquidation of the debtor. Of the remaining 
thirty-six, it appeared that only seventeen plans were actually consummated, for an overall rate of 
operating firms of just 6.5%. See Susan Jensen-Conklin, Do Confirmed Chapter 11 Plans 
Consummate? The Results ofa Study and Analysis of the Law, 97 COM. L.J. 297, 316-30 (1992); 
see also Nancy Rhein Baldiga, Is This Plan Feasible? An Empirical Legal Analysis of Plan 
Feasibility, 101 COM. L.J. 115 (1996) (reporting that half of the confirmed, nonliquidating plans 
failed to consummate, despite the required judicial finding of "feasibility"). 
154. See supra text accompanying notes 108-109. 
155. Moreover, if such a case is filed, the insider guaranty may make reorganization more 
difficult to accomplish. See infra Part II.C. 
156. See, e.g., Tracht, Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers, supra note 152, at 343 (noting that the 
equity of redemption and other borrower protections are often not waivable, thereby protecting 
borrowers from the "mirage of hope"). 
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cost of denying reality for a few more months or years is placed largely 
on the firm's creditors. 157 A personal guaranty can help correct poor 
incentives, but it does little to cure wishful thinking.15s Thus, we can 
expect small business filings to be a mixture of efficient and inefficient 
cases, although with fewer inefficient cases than we would see absent 
insider guaranties. 
There may be another important relationship between insider guar-
anties and the excessive failure rate of small business bankruptcies. 
While closely held firms are most likely to file for bankruptcy when 
insider guaranties have been rendered valueless through the insider's 
lack of assets, that does not make the guaranty irrelevant to the parties' 
conduct within the bankruptcy proceeding. Under plausible assump-
tions, an insider guaranty can destroy the borrower's reorganization 
incentives and create a potentially destructive negotiating dynamic. 
The problem is that, assuming the guaranty cannot be discharged 
through the borrower's bankruptcy case,159 any value retained by the 
guarantor under the plan will be available to the creditor in a suit on the 
guaranty. Thus, where the assets available to the creditor under the plan 
and from the guarantor are not sufficient to result in payment in full, the 
insider guaranty can render reorganization pointless from the guarantor's 
perspective, even if it is value-maximizing for creditors.16o This is sim-
157. One exasperated bankruptcy court judge described the situation this way: 
Bankruptcy is perceived as a haven for wistfulness and the optimist's valhalla where 
the atmosphere is conducive to fantasy and miraculous dreams of the phoenix rising 
from the ruins. Unfortunately, this Court is not held during the full moon, and while 
the rays of sunshine sometimes bring the warming rays of the sun, they more often 
also bring the bright light that makes transparent and evaporates the elaborate 
fantasies constructed of nothing more than gossamer wings and of sophisticated tax 
legerdemain. 
In re Maxim Indus., Inc., 22 B.R. 611, 613 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982). 
158. One bankruptcy with which I am personally familiar involved a small retail establishment 
in an industry that is being consolidated under a few nationwide chains whose costs are 
substantially lower than those of independent stores. Given the underlying economics, the 
business was doomed, yet the owner, who had inherited the business from his parents, was 
emotionally unwilling to acknowledge this fact. After a two-year stay in bankruptcy court, a plan 
of reorganization was confirmed using the "new value exception" to the absolute priority ride. 
Under the plan, some debts were discharged, the owner took out a mortgage on his house (his only 
asset outside the company) to add capital to the business, and he personally guarantied the store 
lease. The end result was a "successful" bankruptcy in that a Chapter 11 plan was confirmed and 
consummated. In reality, the result was that the owner struggled for four additional years to save 
the business, working without a salary. When the store finally closed, the owner was saddled not 
just with the loss of the business he would have had six years earlier, but also with a six-figure 
mortgage on his modest home. Bankruptcy could not change the fact that the store was not 
economically viable. All it could do was keep a negative-present-value enterprise alive for six 
years longer than would have been likely without Chapter 11. 
159. See infra Part IV.B. 
160. From this observation, it could be argued that insider guaranties should be dischargeable 
in the borrower's bankruptcy case. Indeed, several courts appear to have granted at least 
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ply another version of the underinvestment problem. 161 
It could be argued that the guaranty does not preclude reorganiza-
tion, it just reallocates bargaining power during the proceedings. The 
owners of a closely held firm gain substantial leverage through the nego-
tiating structure imposed by a bankruptcy filing. Insiders retain their 
major threat against creditors: that they will walk away, taking all of 
their firm-specific human capital with them and depriving the firm of its 
going concern value. 162 Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code gives the 
debtor in possession an exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganiza-
tion for a period that can be, and often is, extended indefinitely.163 It also 
may permit a plan to be confirmed by "cramdown" over the objection of 
temporary protection to insider guarantors on precisely these grounds. Thus, in In re Northlake 
Bldg Partners, 41 B.R. 231 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1984), the bankruptcy court granted a temporary 
injunction staying suit on a personal guaranty given by the debtor's sole general partner, on 
grounds that he was crucial to managing the debtor's profitable hotel and that the debtor would be 
"irreparahly harmed" by the loss of the guarantor/manager. Similarly, in Codfish Corp. v. FDIC 
(In re Codfish Corp.), 97 B.R. 132 (Bankr. D. P.R. 1988), the FDIC settled with two insider 
guarantors, but not with the firm's president, Mr. da Cunha, who had special expertise needed for 
any reorganization. The bankruptcy court granted a temporary injunction barring the FDIC from 
pursuing Mr. da Cunha, who stated he would have no incentive to work for the debtor if his 
earnings would just be subject to judgment by FDIC. See id. at 134. 
These courts never address why the suit on the guaranty would cause the guarantor to stop 
working to save the debtor. If the court were really correct that the manager was crucial, then the 
creditor may have good reason to cut a deal that will keep the manager's expertise available. One 
suspects that the courts' reasoning involved a level of disingenuousness. In In re Northlake, the 
court previously had ruled that the creditor was oversecured, so the court may have been 
concerned that the creditor was seeking to accelerate a below market rate loan. In re Northlake, 
41 B.R. at 232. Moreover, if the creditor was fully secured, the costs of a foregone reorganization 
would accrue entirely to unsecured creditors and equity holders, and the guarantied creditor would 
be indifferent between liquidation and reorganization. On these facts, actions by the secured 
creditor that endanger the reorganization should be stayed. 
In In re Codfish Corp., the court noted that Mr. Da Cunha had no assets, so the FDIC 
supposedly lost nothing from the injunction. However, if he really had no assets, the injunction 
was unnecessary. The FDIC would have no incentive to go after him, and, if it irrationally did so, 
Mr. Da Cunha could file for bankruptcy with no loss. If his expertise was so crucial, the FDIC, as 
the firm's primary creditor, should be willing to cut a deal. After all, they compromised with the 
debtor and two other guarantors. Although there is no way to tell from the opinion, the FDIC may 
have believed the guarantor was somehow holding out, and was using the leverage of the guaranty 
to prevent this - in which case, the court enjoined the FDIC from using the guaranty to 
accomplish precisely the goals the guaranty had been intended to further. In re Codfish Corp., 97 
B.R. at 97. On the other hand, the court may have believed that the FDIC had ulterior motives or 
was not negotiating in good faith (a thought that would probably not surprise anyone who dealt 
with the FDIC in midst of the savings and loan crisis) and thus was seeking to break a negotiating 
impasse by restraining the FDIC. 
161. Moreover, by reducing the prospect that an insolvent guarantor will be able to retain a 
stake through reorganization, the guaranty may prevent the prospect of deviations from absolute 
priority from mitigating perverse prebankruptcy incentives. See supra text accompanying notes 
80-88. 
162. See Baird & Picker, supra note 123, at 318-24. 
163. See Kordana & Posner, supra note 85, at 182-90. 
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some creditors. l64 This combination gives insiders control of the bar-
gaining agenda, which can allow them to extract the lion's share of the 
firm's going concern value. 165 On top of these legal advantages, insid-
ers often have informational advantages that give them an important 
edge in negotiating a plan of reorganization. 166 
Creditors, on the other hand, are deprived of their primary negotiat-
ing threat (enforcement of their contractual rights against the borrower) 
by operation of the automatic stay.167 If the firm's shareholders are lia-
ble on personal guaranties that exceed their assets, however, any value 
extracted by virtue of these bargaining advantages is subject to levy and 
attachment by the guarantied creditor. Moreover, the automatic stay, 
which bars creditors from pursuing remedies against the borrower once 
it files for bankruptcy, does not enjoin suits against third party guaran-
tors. 168 Thus, an insider guaranty allows additional pressure to be 
brought to bear on the firm's principals during the bankruptcy case, and 
it significantly decreases the value of "cramming down" any plan of 
reorganization under which they retain value without the consent of the 
guarantied creditor. 
Chapter 11 is a bargaining process, it might be argued, and the 
insider guaranty simply shifts the parameters within which the debtor 
and creditors bargain. There is nothing sacrosanct about bargaining sans 
guaranty. If the insiders truly bring value to the enterprise, as they often 
do, and have few outside assets, the creditor may be induced to release 
the personal guaranties in exchange for a payout from the reorganized 
debtor that exceeds the liquidation dividend available if the insiders 
walk away plus the recovery available if they are sued on their guaran-
ties. Moreover, guarantors with few assets have a credible response to 
creditor pressure - personal bankruptcy. 
This natural response misses a crucial point, however. The insider 
guaranty not only changes the balance of leverage between the parties, it 
also changes the nature of the bargaining, by removing cramdown as a 
viable threat. 169 Assume for the moment that it is efficient to reorganize 
164. See Baird & Picker, supra note 123, at 121; Kordana & Posner, supra note 85, at 193-96. 
165. See Kordana & Posner, supra note 85, at 182-90. 
166. See id. at 173-82; LoPucki, Debtor in Full Control, supra note 70, at 257. 
167. See Baird & Picker, supra note 123, at 320-24. 
168. See, e.g., Credit Alliance Corp. v. Williams, 851 F.2d 119, 120 (4th Cir. 1988) ("Nothing 
in § 362 suggests that Congress intended that provision to strip from the creditors of a bankrupt 
debtor the protection they sought and received when they required a third party to guaranty the 
debt."). 
169. See, e.g., Richard F. Broude, Cramdown and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: The 
Settlement Imperative, 39 Bus. LAW. 441 (1984) (arguing that cramdown is "used more as a threat 
[to induce settlement] than as a club actually employed in confirming a plan of reorganization"); 
Jack Friedman, What Courts Do To Secured Creditors in Chapter 11 Cram Down, 14 CARDOZO L. 
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the firm. The firm is most likely in bankruptcy because a bargaining 
impasse between the firm and its major creditor(s) prevented an out-of-
court workout. Absent the guaranty (or if the guarantor is solvent), 
insiders have two bargaining strategies they can use to try to reach a 
consensual resolution in the bankruptcy case: They can threaten either 
liquidation or cramdown. The threat of cramdown generally requires a 
demonstration of commitment to the business and strong indications that 
reorganization is possible. The creditor must believe that the insiders 
are willing to commit "new value" to the company in order to reorganize 
over the creditor's objection. To make a liquidation threat credible, 
however, the insider may have to act in precisely the opposite manner in 
order to demonstrate that the insider considers the business expendable. 
A liquidation threat may require insiders to openly devote time to alter-
natives (like searching for or even taking new jobs, or starting a new 
company) to demonstrate their willingness to let the company die. It is 
not hard to picture failure as an outcome when each side is saying to the 
other, "Give in, or I'll liquidate the company!" Creditors always 
threaten liquidation; if insiders have no alternative but to threaten liqui-
dation as well, the negotiations will involve a level of brinkmanship that 
may lead to the failure of the firm even though a cramdown threat, were 
one available, might have led to a consensual reorganization. 
D. Conclusions 
The insider guaranty is not just a contract of financial assurance, 
providing the creditor with an additional source of recovery should the 
borrower default. It is a screening, bonding, and control device intended 
to align shareholder and managerial incentives with the interests of the 
guarantied creditor. To the extent that it improves over other methods 
addressing the financial agency problem, it can be expected to lower 
borrowing costs for small firms. Anything that interferes with the lever-
age granted to a creditor by an insider guaranty threatens these benefits. 
As a result, caution is appropriate in considering any bankruptcy rules 
that might impair the functioning of insider guaranties. On the other 
hand, there are situations where an insider guaranty may create inappro-
priate incentives. The question is whether bankruptcy law is capable of 
reducing the costs of these situations without causing greater harm than 
good. Part IV attempts to provide some guidance on that question by 
considering two important issues raised by insider guaranties in bank-
ruptcy, using the agency theory framework developed above. 
REv. 1495. 1497 (1993) (noting that "[fJear of [cramdown] causes parties to settle rather than 
litigate in the great majority of cases"). 
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IV . ApPLICATIONS 
The analysis provided in Part ill can help us make appropriate deci-
sions when legal rules are forced to confront the mixed nature-finan-
cial assurance and creditor leverage-of the insider guaranty. The 
following sections apply the framework developed above to two critical 
issues in the treatment of insider guaranties in bankruptcy. First, con-
sider the "insider preference" or "Deprizio" problem: Under the 
Deprizio doctrine, payments made to a creditor who holds an insider 
guaranty are considered payments for the benefit of the insider. Accord-
ingly, they are subject to the one year preference period for insiders, 
rather than the ninety day preference period for general creditors. This 
doctrine quickly became a lightning rod for commentary and Congres-
sionallobbying, and has been the primary context in which insider guar-
anties have been scrutinized. An agency cost analysis of the 
Congressional "fix" adopted in 1994 to mollify lenders shows that Con-
gress addressed the problem in a manner that might generously be 
described as "poorly conceived." 
The second application offered here is of a problem that has yet to 
break out into the judicial arena, although we can expect this to change 
rapidly come the next recession. "Springing" and "exploding" guaran-
ties-devices that impose personal liability on insiders only if the bor-
rower becomes subject to a bankruptcy proceeding-have become 
extremely common during the 1990s. These devices can be challenged 
on numerous grounds, including breach of fiduciary duties and violation 
of fundamental bankruptcy policies. As shown below, these devices are 
far more troubling than insider guaranties in general (and even more 
troubling than explicit waivers of a firm's right to file for bankruptcy), 
and should not be enforced by the courts. 
A. Preference Law: The Deprizio Debate 
The primary objection to insider guaranties appears to be the pref-
erence concern: that the insider will direct funds to the guarantied credi-
tor as bankruptcy looms on the horizon. The prospect of such 
preferential payments raises two different objections: (1) that such pay-
ments will reduce the total amount available to the firm's creditors; or 
(2) that such payments will unfairly benefit one creditor at the expense 
of others po 
170. These are the two concerns that lie at the heart of preference law. 
The purpose of the preference section is two-fold. First, by pennitting the trustee to 
avoid prebankruptcy transfers that occur within a short period before bankruptcy, 
creditors are discouraged from racing to the courthouse to dismember the debtor 
during his slide into bankruptcy. The protection thus afforded the debtor often 
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The problem is easy enough to see. Consider once more the hypo-
thetical presented in Part II.A., 171 but assume that the insider has guaran-
tied $50 of the firm's $100 debt. If the firm is reorganized to realize, 
say, $80 in going-concern value for creditors, shared pro-rata, the guar-
antor will face $10 in residual liability on the guaranty.172 However, if 
the guarantied creditor is able to levy on the firm's assets before the 
other creditors, then this creditor will be paid in full and the guarantor's 
liability will be extinguished, leaving only $20 (of the $70 piecemeal 
value) available to the other unsecured creditors. Thus, the insider guar-
anty may create an incentive for the guarantor to collude in an inefficient 
dismemberment if the proceeds can be directed to the guarantied obliga-
tion. The result is both unfair (viewed from a baseline entitlement of pro 
rata sharing) and inefficient. 
The primary occasion for debate about the relationship between 
preference law and insider guaranties has been the Deprizio doctrine. 
To provide a brief overview: Absent certain defenses outside our current 
concern, a payment to a creditor is a preference, and can be recovered by 
the debtor, if the payment is made (1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; 
(2) on account of a preexisting debt; (3) while the debtor is insolvent; (4) 
within ninety days before the bankruptcy filing; and (5) if the payment 
allows the creditor to receive more than the creditor would have 
received if the payment had not been made and the debtor were liqui-
dated under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 173 Thus, payments to 
unsecured or undersecured creditors, made within ninety days of bank-
ruptcy, may be avoidable. 174 
If the payment is to or for the benefit of a creditor who is an 
"insider" of the debtor, the preference period is extended to a full year 
enables him to work his way out of a difficult financial situation through 
cooperation with all of his creditors. Second, and more important, the preference 
provisions facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among 
creditors of the debtor. Any creditor that received a greater payment than others of 
his class is required to disgorge so that all may share equally. 
H.R. REp. No. 95-595, at 177-78, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138. 
171. See supra text accompanying notes 28-35. 
172. That is, the $80 going-concern value will be split evenly, paying $40 on the guarantied 
debt and $40 on the unguarantied debt. 
173. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1999). 
174. Payments to fully secured creditors generally are not avoidable as preferences because a 
fully secured creditor would be paid in full in a Chapter 7 proceeding, although it is possible for a 
payment to a fully secured creditor to be an indirect preference. See, e.g., Pitts, supra note 9, at 
356-57 (payment to fully secured creditor may be deemed for the benefit of an undersecured 
creditor with a lien on the same collateral; under section 550(a), payment could be recovered from 
either creditor); but see 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY'll 550.02[5], at 550-15 (15th ed. 1990) 
(arguing that recovery from the fully secured creditor should not be permitted). 
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before the bankruptcy.175 Under the "Deprizio doctrine,"176 a payment 
on a debt guarantied by an insider was deemed to be "to or for the bene-
fit of a creditor ... [who] at the time of such transfer was an insider,"l77 
and was therefore subject to the full one-year preference period. 178 
Moreover, this preference could be recovered either from the guarantor 
or from the creditor itself.179 Thus, an insider guaranty could actually 
harm the lender if the debtor filed for bankruptcy by making it possible 
175. See 11 u.s.c. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1999). Although there is no bright-line definition of 
insider, it includes officers, directors, general partners, or relatives of the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. 
§101(31) (1999). Because the definition of insider is not exclusive, it is possible to argue that, on 
the facts in a given case, a creditor had such extensive control over the debtor that the creditor had 
become an "insider" in its own right. The case law, however, has generally permitted a substantial 
exercise of control by creditors without deeming those creditors to have become insiders, and 
certainly more than is exercised merely by threatening enforcement of an insider's guaranty. See, 
e.g., Carlson v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Newcomb), 744 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1984) ("It is 
conceivable that a creditor could become so involved in the day-to-day business of a debtor as to 
become an insider. However, the mere fact that a large creditor has 'control' over the debtor, in 
the sense that the creditor can compel payment of a debt, does not make the creditor an insider."); 
Gray v. Giant Wholesale Corp., 758 F.2d 1000, 1003 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that creditor who 
controlled dispensation of debtor's checks was not an insider). 
176. Named after the case that made the issue prominent, Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In 
re Deprizio Constr. Corp), 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989). The basic reasoning - that a payment 
to a creditor may be avoided as a preference because it is a payment for the benefit of an insider 
- pre-dates the current Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Smith v. Totstevin, 247 F. 102 (2d Cir. 
1917) (holding that payment to bank was voidable as preference to debtor's wife, who had 
pledged collateral to secure the loan); Bullard v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 468 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 
1972) (holding transfer preferential where benefit accrued to debtor's president). 
177. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1-4) (1999). 
178. See, e.g., Galloway v. First Ala. Bank (In re Wesley Indus., Inc.), 30 F.3d 1438 (lIth 
Cir.1994); Official Unsecured Creditors Comm. v. U.S. Nat'l Bank (In re Sufolla, Inc.), 2 F.3d 
977 (9th Cir. 1993); T.B. Westex Foods, Inc. v. FDIC (In re T.B. Westex Foods, Inc.), 950 F.2d 
1187 (5th Cir. 1992); Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co.), 899 F.2d 1490 (6th 
Cir. 1990); Lowrey v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc.), 892 F.2d 850 (lOth 
Cir. 1989); In re Deprizio Constr. Corp., 874 F.2d at 1186; see also Traveler's Ins. v. Cambridge 
Meridian Group, Inc., (In re Erin Food Servs., Inc.), 980 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1992) (declining to 
decide the issue, but assuming Deprizio was correct for purposes of the decision); Southmark 
Corp. v. Southmark Personal Storage, Inc. (In re Southmark Corp.), 993 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(agreeing with Deprizio rule provided insider received more than an incidental benefit from 
transfer). But see, e.g., Hovis v. Powers Constr. Co. (In re Hoffman Assocs., Inc.), 179 B.R. 797 
(Bankr. D. s.c. 1995); H & C Partnership v. Virginia Servo Merchandisers, Inc., 164 B.R. 527 
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 1994); Performance Communications, Inc. v. First Nat' 1 Bank (In re 
Performance Communications, Inc.), 126 B.R. 473 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991); Official Creditors' 
Comm. of Arundel Hous. Components, Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. (In re Arundel Hous. 
Components, Inc.), 126 B.R. 216 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991); Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc. v. Chemical 
Bank (In re Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc.), 119 B.R. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Goldberger v. Davis Jay 
Corrugated Box Corp. (In re Mercon Indus.), 37 B.R. 549 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); Bakst v. 
Schilling (In re Cove Patio, Inc.), 19 B.R. 843 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982). 
179. See II U.S.C. § 550 (1999). This provision governs the recovery of an avoided transfer, 
and section 550(a) provides, in relevant part, that an avoided transfer may be recovered from "(I) 
the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made .... " 
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for the debtor to recover payments that had been made to the lender 
between ninety days and one year before the filing. 
The Deprizio decision elicited a tremendous response. The lending 
community reacted with loud expressions of shock and outrage, pro-
testing that the decision was unreasonable and unfair. 180 Commentators 
defendedl81 or attackedl82 the decision. While the precise theory on 
which insider preferences should be condemned has often been disputed, 
the common explanation is that it is unfair to permit insiders to use their 
superior information regarding the firm's affairs to advantage them-
selves at the expense of other creditors. 183 Few, if any, of Deprizio's 
critics disagreed with this sentiment. Rather, they responded that it was 
unfair to "punish" the "innocent" lender for its prudence in taking a 
guaranty. 184 
180. Indeed, prior to the Deprizio decision, a number of courts had rejected the extension of 
the preference period as applied to an outside creditor holding an insider guaranty, citing equitable 
concerns. See, e.g., Block v. Texas Commerce Bank N.A. (In re Midwestern Cos.), 96 B.R. 224 
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988), affd, 102 B.R. 169 (W.D. Mo. 1989); In re Aerco Metals, Inc. 60 B.R. 
77 (Bankr. N. D. Tex. 1985); Schmitt v. Equibank (In re R.A. Beck Builder, Inc.), 34 B.R. 888 
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983); Seeley v. Church Bldgs. and Interiors, Inc. (In re Church Bldgs. and 
Interiors, Inc.), 14 B.R. 128 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981); see also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY'll 
550.02 (15th ed. 1990) (disagreeing with Deprizio-type reasoning on grounds that it would permit 
recovery from a party innocent of wrongdoing and deserving protection). 
181. See, e.g., Torn Lane, Recovery of Avoidable Transfers from the "Initial Transferee" 
Under Section 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,96 COM. LJ. 457 (1991) (supporting 
Deprizio); Peter L. Borowitz, Waiving Subrogation Rights and Conjuring Up Demons in Response 
to Deprizio, 45 Bus. LAW. 2151 (1990) (defending the policy basis, but not technical reasoning, of 
Deprizio); Pitts, supra note 9 (advocating the reading of section 550(a) that was later adopted in 
Deprizio); Dix, note, supra note 101. 
182. See, e.g., Donald W. Baker, Repayments of Loans Guaranteed by Insiders as Avoidable 
Preferences in Bankruptcy: Deprizio and Its Aftermath, 23 U.C.C. L.J. 115 (1990) (arguing that 
Deprizio is unsound and should be reconsidered); Robert F. Higgins & David E. Peterson, Is 
There a One-Year Preference Period for Non-Insiders?, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 383 (1990) 
(criticizing Deprizio as a mechanical and unfair application of the Bankruptcy Code); John 
Stephen Cullina, Comment, Recharacterizing Insider Preferences As Fraudulent Conveyances: A 
Different View of Levit v. Ingersoll Rand, 77 VA. L. REv. 149 (1991) (suggesting that the 
Bankruptcy Code be amended to recharacterize insider preferences as fraudulent conveyances); 
Nussbaum, supra note 9 (same); James A. Rodenberg, Note, Indirect Preferences: Recovery 
Under Sections 547 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code, 55 Mo. L. REv. 327 (1990) (arguing against 
the Deprizio doctrine and in favor of flexible approach to the insider preference question); Mark 
E. Toth, Comment, The Impossible State of Preference Law Under the Bankruptcy Code: Levit v. 
Ingersoll Rand and the Problem of Insider-Guaranteed Debt, 1990 WIS. L. REv. 1155. 
183. See cases cited by McCoid, supra note 142, at 819-20; WILLIAM A. FLETCHER, 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRrvATE CORPORATIONS §7469 (Timothy P. Bjur & J. Jeffrey 
Reinholtz, eds., rev. vol. 1990) ("Generally, the rule prohibiting preferences to directors is not 
founded upon the trust fund doctrine, but upon the theory that it is inequitable that directors, 
whose knowledge of conditions and power to act for the corporation give them an advantage, 
should be permitted to protect their own claims to the detriment of others at a time when it is 
apparent that all the unsecured debts of the corporation are equally in peril and that all of them 
cannot be paid."). 
184. Many cases finding for lenders, prior to the Deprizio decision itself, relied on vague 
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With the widespread adoption of the Deprizio reasoning, lenders 
found themselves in a quandary. On the one hand, they did not want to 
give up the benefits of insider guaranties. On the other hand, they were 
seriously troubled by the risk presented by a one-year preference period. 
Rather than abandoning insider guaranties - and pending the outcome 
of a substantial lobbying effort to have the rule reversed -lenders fast-
ened on a supposed "solution" to the Deprizio problem: having the 
insider guarantor waive its rights to recover from the debtor by way of 
subrogation or reimbursement for any amounts paid under the guar-
anty.185 With such a waiver, some courts have held, the insider is not a 
"creditor" with respect to the guarantied obligation, and so the payment 
does not benefit an insider "creditor" and is not subject to the one-year 
preference period. 186 
The effects of the Deprizio doctrine were substantially curtailed by 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.187 Under the Reform Act's amend-
ments to section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code, if a transfer made between 
ninety days and one year before the filing of the bankruptcy petition is 
avoided as a preference because it was made for the benefit of a creditor 
who was an insider, the payment may not be recovered from a transferee 
incantations of the "inequity" of applying the extended preference period to an outside creditor. 
See. e.g .• In re Perfonnance Communications. Inc .• 126 B.R. 473, 477 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) 
(holding that it would be inequitable for the lender to suffer for its prudence); In re Aerco Metals, 
Inc., 60 B.R. 77, 82 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985) (stating that the law should not "punish the Bank for 
[its] prudence"); In re R.A. Beck Builder, Inc., 34 B.R. 888, 894 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983) (stating 
that it would be inequitable to "penalize" bank for its prudence); see also COLLIER, supra note 
174, 'I 550.02. 
185. See. e.g., In re Northeastern Contracting Co., 187 B.R. 420 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995); In re 
XTI Xonix Tech., Inc. 156 B.R. 821 (Bankr. D. Or. 1993); In re Fastrans, 142 B.R. 241 (Bankr. 
E.D. Tenn. 1992); Timothy R. Zinnecker, Lawyers Who Draft and Negotiate Guaranties (and the 
Clients Who Lave Them), 35 S. TEX. L. REv. 387, 401-04 (1994); Borowitz, supra note 181. 
186. See. e.g., In re Deprizio Constr. Corp., 874 F.2d at 1191-92; In re Northeastern 
Contracting Co., 187 BR 420 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995); In re XTI Xonix Tech., Inc., 156 BR 821 
(Bankr. D. Or. 1993); In re Fastrans, Inc., 142 BR 241 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1992). Professor 
Westbrook has argued that such waivers should be held unenforceable, but no court has yet held 
them so. See Westbrook, Two Thoughts, supra note 122, at 88; see also Covey v. Northwest 
Community Bank (In re Helen Gallagher Enter., Inc.), 126 B.R. 997 (Bankr. C.D. TIl. 1991) 
(suggesting, in dicta, that reimbursement waiver may be unenforceable). The requirement that 
there be a nexus between the guaranty and the insider's status as a creditor has been criticized on 
both technical and policy grounds. See, e.g., Borowitz, supra note 181, at 2156 (arguing that a 
waiver of subrogation rights only increases the incentive for the guarantor to prefer the creditor 
whose obligation he guarantied); David L. Katzen, Deprizio and Bankruptcy Code Section 550: 
Extended Preference Exposure via Insider Guarantees. and Other Perils of Initial Transferee 
Liability, 45 Bus. LAW. 511, 530-51 (1990) (same); Given, Lenders Gunned Down in Gangland 
Killing - Preferences After Deprizio, FALKNER & GRAY'S BANKR. L. REv., Winter 1990, 53, 56 
(stating that waiver of subrogation rights increases incentive to prefer the guarantied creditor, and 
may add merit to the contention that the payment is a fraudulent conveyance made with the intent 
to hinder, delay or defraud other creditors). 
187. Bankruptcy Refonn Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994). 
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who was not an insider. 188 
Note that this amendment does not fully remove the burden 
imposed by the Deprizio rule. It does not change the definition of a 
preference, contained in section 547, to eliminate payments made 
between ninety days and one year before the bankruptcy filing on obli-
gations guarantied by an insider. These payments are still avoidable 
preferences and can still be recovered from the insider guarantor. Under 
section 550( c), however, they can no longer be recovered from the 
creditor. 
Although the estate cannot recover these payments from the credi-
tor, the creditor may still suffer various ill effects from the fact that these 
payments fall within the definition of preferential transfers. For exam-
ple, section 502(d) provides that the court shall disallow the claims of 
any party who is a transferee of an avoidable transfer unless the party 
has returned the transfer. 189 Thus, if the guarantor cannot or does not 
repay the preference, the creditor's claims against the estate may be dis-
allowed. Moreover, if the preferential transfer was the granting of a lien 
to the creditor to secure a preexisting debt, then the transfer can still be 
avoided under section 547 (voiding the lien); the proscription in section 
550(c) does not apply because the estate has no need to recover anything 
from the creditor under section 550(a).190 To avoid these problems, 
many lenders continue to insist upon subrogation and reimbursement 
waivers from their insider guarantors notwithstanding the 1994 amend-
ments that supposedly reversed the Deprizio doctrine. 
As can be seen from this short recital, the preference analysis of 
debts secured by insider guaranties has received a great deal of atten-
tion. 191 By and large, however, the analysis has taken place at an histor-
ical and doctrinal level, supplemented with ad hoc judgments about the 
coercive effects of guaranties. In analyzing the preference issues, little 
188. See II u.s.c. § 550 (1999). The 1994 amendments added section 550(c), as follows: 
If a transfer made between 90 days and one year before the filing of the petition -
(I) is avoided under section 547(b) of this title; and (2) was made for the benefit of 
a creditor that at the time of such transfer was an insider; the trustee may not recover 
under subsection (a) from a transferee that is not an insider. 
189. Section 502( d) provides in relevant part that 
the court shall disallow any claim of any entity from which property is recoverable 
under section ... 550 ... of this title, or that is a transferee of a transfer avoidable 
under section ... 547 ... of this title, unless such entity or transferee has paid the 
amount . . . for which such entity or transferee is liable. . .. 
II U.S.C. §502(d) (1999). 
190. See, e.g., Williams v. Assocs. Home Equity Serv., Inc., 1999 WL 388210 (Bankr. D. Or. 
1999) (holding that the preferential transfer of a lien may be avoided under section 547 without 
invoking the recovery provisions of section 550). 
191. See, e.g., McCoid, supra note 142, at 806 ("Because no unified approach to the problem 
exists, the courts have reached conflicting results in insider preference cases."). 
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or no effort seems to have been made to systematically examine the 
functions of the insider guaranty. 
Consider an oft-cited exchange between two highly respected com-
merciallaw scholars, Professors Jay Westbrook and Peter Alces. 192 Pro-
fessor Westbrook argued that the commentary on Deprizio had generally 
overlooked two essential points, one of which was "the distinction 
between insider guarantees taken for their economic value, because the 
insider has the wherewithal to pay the debt, and those that are purely a 
matter of pressure on the insider to misdirect the debtor's funds."193 
Professor Alces responded in part that this dichotomy was unrealistic, 
because all guaranties are a mixture, intended to accomplish both func-
tions to greater or lesser degrees. 194 What both points of view share is 
an assumption that the leverage aspect of an insider guaranty is gener-
ally improper or illegitimate. 195 They focus on the creditor's ability to 
use its leverage to compel preferential treatment, minimizing the broader 
functions and benefits offered by insider guaranties. 196 
Professor Westbrook notes approvingly that Deprizio will discour-
age lenders from taking "pure leverage" guaranties, meaning that the 
guarantor does not have wealth to make payment on the guaranty and 
the purpose of the guaranty is simply to provide leverage to the creditor 
to secure a preferential payment. 197 What Professor Westbrook does not 
explain is why the preferential effect of this creditor leverage - to the 
extent that it exists against an impecunious guarantor198 - will exceed 
192. See Westbrook, Two Thoughts, supra note 122; Peter A. A1ces, Rethinking Professor 
Westbrook's Two Thoughts About Insider Preferences, 77 MINN. L. REv. 605 (1993) [hereinafter 
A1ces, Rethinking]; Westbrook, Clear Thinking, supra note 101; Peter A. A1ces, Clearer 
Conceptions of Insider Preferences, 71 WASH. U.L.Q. (1993) [hereinafter A1ces, Clearer 
Conceptions] . 
193. Westbrook, Two Thoughts, supra note 122, at 74. 
194. A1ces, Rethinking, supra note 192, at 621-23 
195. Neither completely ignores this fact. See Westbrook, Two Thoughts, supra note 122, at 
84 n.46 (discussing, in a footnote, the wayan insider guaranty may induce a guarantor to assist in 
an efficient liquidation of the debtor); A1ces, Clearer Conceptions, supra note 192, at 1110-11 
(noting the commitment aspect of the guaranty). Yet neither appears to consider it a significant 
element of the analysis, repeatedly seeming to assume that the only relevant function of leverage 
is to secure a preferential payment should the debtor get into financial trouble. 
196. See Westbrook, Two Thoughts, supra note 122, at 80-81 ("[T]he value of this sort of 
guarantee to the lender lies almost completely in the exercise of precisely the sort of pressure the 
anti-dismemberment policy is designed to prevent."). 
197. See Westbrook, Two Thoughts, supra note 122, at 80-81, 85. 
198. Professor Alces questions whether a guaranty can pressure an insider who lacks assets to 
pay on that guaranty. A1ces, Rethinking, supra note 192, at 616-18. Professor Westbrook 
suggests that "the leverage on a pure-leverage guarantor must consist of either the threat to seize 
assets of great personal value to the insider, but of little intrinsic value, or the threat of being 
forced into personal bankruptcy. Both aspects of the pure-leverage guarantee are in terrorem 
pressures that are generally regarded as quasi-legitimate at best." Westbrook, Two Thoughts, 
supra note 122, at 82. 
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its beneficial effects. If insider guaranties are primarily a means of 
screening borrowers, reducing agency costs, and ensuring the insider's 
commitment to the business,199 then Deprizio, if it discouraged the tak-
ing of such guaranties, could have significant economic costs. 
Moreover, Professor Westbrook's expectation that Deprizio would 
discourage "leverage" guaranties but not "true" guaranties might have 
been accurate had courts agreed with him that reimbursement waivers 
should be held unenforceable.2°O However, because the courts seem to 
have rejected this suggestion, lenders can continue to take leverage guar-
anties; they just have to change the form contracts they use. Indeed, the 
insider's motivation to cause the debtor to pay the guarantied creditor 
ahead of others is increased by a reimbursement waiver because pay-
ment by the debtor is the only way for the guarantor to avoid bearing the 
ultimate liability.201 If these waivers are enforceable, as it appears they 
are, then one of Professor Westbrook's primary bases for supporting the 
extended preference period (that it will discourage leverage guaranties) 
is lost. 
An agency theory approach to insider guaranties provides separate 
and distinct bases for supporting the Deprizio rule and opposing the 
creditor protection granted by Congress under section 550(c). As dis-
cussed above, an insider guaranty may improve the incentives for man-
agement to make efficient investment decisions in or near insolvency.202 
The Deprizio extension of the preference period on payments to the 
guarantied creditor is one means of preserving these beneficial incentive 
effects. If the guaranty leads the firm to repay the guarantied debt 
between ninety days and one year before the filing and that payment 
cannot be recovered from either the creditor or the guarantor, then the 
benefits of converting the managing equity holder into a creditor are 
lost. If the payment can be recovered, however, then the insider will 
want to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate in order to mini-
mize its guaranty.liability. Thus, the extension of the preference period 
seems to further the monitoring and bonding aspects of the insider guar-
anty, benefitting the entire estate. 
If section 550(c) renders the payment unrecoverable from the credi-
tor, and if the guarantor lacks the funds to repay the preferential pay-
ment (a situation that is probably not uncommon), these benefits will be 
lost. Without section 550(c), recovery from the guarantied creditor 
would likely be available, and would restore the incentive effects identi-
199. See supra Part II.B. 
200. Westbrook, Two Thoughts, supra note 122, at 81. 
201. See Alces, Rethinking, supra note 192, at 626. 
202. See supra text accompanying notes 95-127. 
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fied above.203 
Section 550(c) may drive a wedge between the interests of the 
insider and the interests of other creditors in a second way. If the insider 
lacks the funds to repay the avoided transfer, then not only is the insider 
not a creditor on account of the reimbursement claim for the guarantied 
debt (because the insider has not paid that debt),204 but any other claims 
held by the insider will also be disallowed, under section 502(d). But it 
is desirable for the insider creditor to hold general claims against the 
estate because they provide an enhanced incentive to maximize the 
return to creditors. 205 
If section 550(c) can be criticized for protecting guarantied credi-
tors too much, it can also be criticized for protecting them too little. An 
agency analysis supports Professor Westbrook in objecting to the effects 
of reimbursement waivers, because such waivers diminish the incentive 
alignment effects of the insider guaranty. Recall that under a traditional 
insider guaranty, the beneficial incentive effects exist both before pay-
ment (because the guarantor wants to reduce its liability) and after pay-
ment (because the guarantor wants to maximize its recovery on its 
subrogation or reimbursement claim against the debtor).206 However, if 
the guarantor has waived its right to recover from the debtor for pay-
ments made on the guaranty, then the incentive benefits of the guaran-
tor's residual claimant status are lost once the guarantor pays the 
creditor. Thus, reimbursement waivers reduce the ability of the guaranty 
to mitigate perverse prebankruptcy incentives.207 For this reason, the 
changes made by the 1994 amendments would probably be beneficial if 
they induced creditors to drop the demand that guarantors waive their 
reimbursement rights. Because the 1994 Amendments only partially 
undid the Deprizio reasoning, however, and lenders still suffer potential 
risks from the extended preference period,208 lenders are continuing to 
203. If the insider does not have the assets to repay the preference, then the insider may not 
have much at risk on its guaranty, and thus the incentive alignment will be less than perfect. The 
guaranty, however, is still likely to improve incentives to some extent. 
204. See 11 u.s.c. § 502(e)(1)(8) (1999) (disallowing any claim for reimbursement or 
contribution by a guarantor if that claim is still contingent as of the time of allowance or 
disallowance). 
205. See supra Part ill.A. 
206. See supra Part ill.C. 
207. It could be argued that the willingness of creditors to continue to take insider guaranties 
with the indemnification waiver indicates that the incentive alignment effects identified above are 
not the motivating force behind insider guaranties. I believe this overstates the case. Rather, it 
appears that creditors would prefer a guaranty with a waiver to no guaranty at all. This makes 
sense, considering that the guaranty with waiver of reimbursement still provides both bonding and 
screening functions, albeit less robustly, as well as an additional potential source of repayment. 
208. See supra text accompanying note 190. 
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seek these waivers, and some of the value of insider guaranties is being 
lost. 
Moreover, if the insider guaranty is intended to provide an incen-
tive for the equity holders to maximize the value of the firm in periods 
of financial distress, a central means of doing this may be through an 
out-of-court restructuring. The extended preference period has been 
criticized as being inimical to workouts, because payments or security 
offered to a guarantied creditor as part of a restructuring will be avoided 
in any bankruptcy filed within a full year. Thus, lenders may hesitate to 
enter into restructurings.209 Viewed another way, by extending the pref-
erence period, the insider guaranty may create an opportunity for a 
debtor to file for bankruptcy simply to avoid concessions previously 
made to a guarantied lender. The concern for consensual restructurings 
appears consistent with the basic thrust of section 550(c): holding the 
insider liable for recovery of the preference, but not the lender. Properly 
implemented, this scheme would allow the lender to make concessions 
toward a workout without fear of extended liability. It would also dis-
courage the insider from making concessions with the debtor's assets to 
avoid liability on the guaranty, because the insider knows it may be held 
liable for the recovery of those concessions. Unfortunately, section 
550(c) falls short of offering this type of protection to workouts, because 
many concessions that would be made to a lender during the extended 
preference period (such as new or additional liens) are still subject to 
avoidance under section 547. 
In short, the protection of creditors under Section 550(c) appears to 
be the worst of all possible worlds. The Code now prohibits recovery of 
the preferential transfer from the party most likely to be able to pay. 
This reduces the beneficial incentive effects of the insider guaranty. 
Section 550( c) will often damage shareholder incentives further by lead-
ing to the disallowance of insider's claims under section 502(d). And 
because Congress chose to address the problem through the recovery 
provision rather than by modifying the definition of a preferential trans-
fer in section 547, workouts will still be discouraged and lenders will 
still insist on reimbursement waivers, further damaging the positive 
incentive effects of insider guaranties. 
B. Springing and Exploding Guaranties 
1. BACKGROUND 
If the Deprizio debate was the first issue to put a spotlight on 
209. This argument was raised in the Deprizio opinion itself but the court discounted it, 
writing, "the fear of bankruptcy replacing some workouts does not lead us to shy away from an 
ordinary reading of the statute." In re Deprezio Constr. Corp., 874 F.2d at 1198. 
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insider guaranties, we can now see the outlines of the second: "spring-
ing" and "exploding" guaranties. A springing guaranty is a guaranty of 
an enterprise's debt, given by an insider, which will become effective 
only upon specified conditions.z1O Typically, those conditions include 
the filing of a bankruptcy case by the borrower or failure to have any 
involuntary bankruptcy case quickly dismissed. An exploding guaranty 
is the mirror image, a guaranty that is in effect but will become void if 
the borrower cooperates with the lender after any default. The effect is 
the same: The insider will be personally liable for the debt if the bor-
rower contests the lender's rights or remedies, or files a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, after default. The insider will be free from liability if the 
borrower "rolls over" and lets the lender enforce its remedies without a 
contest.211 
These devices (hereinafter referred to as "bankruptcy-contingent 
guaranties") were developed in the early 1990s and have rapidly become 
210. For sample documents, see WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW & 
PRACTICE (2d ed. 1981), Form § 1111:2 (non-recourse provision with carve-out for bankruptcy 
proceedings); Lester M. Bliwise, Mortgage Lending Documentation, Attachment C ("Model 
Springing Guaranty"), in COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FINANCING 9, 61 (PLI Real Est. Law & 
Practice Course Handbook Series No. N4-4603, 1997) (although entitled a "Springing Guaranty," 
this is actually a terminable or "exploding" guaranty); Sidney A. Keyles, Counseling the Client on 
Springing and Exploding Guaranties (with Forms), 12 PRAC. REAL EST. LAW. 29 (Nov. 1996); 
MICHAEL T. MADISON AND JEFFRY R. DWYER, THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING (rev. ed. 
1996), Forms 14.2 ("Guaranty: Springing") and 14.3 ("Guaranty Agreement: Exploding"); Joshua 
Stein, Lender's Model State-of-the-Art Nonrecourse Clause (with Carveouts), 43 PRAc. LAW. 31 
(1997). 
211. The same effect can be created in nonrecourse lending, which is common in commercial 
real estate finance, by creating a "carve-out" from the nonrecourse provisions. See, e.g., ALAN 
WA YTE, NON-RECOURSE CLAUSE, reprinted in MODERN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 1575, 1585-
86 (ALI-ABA Resource Materials, 11 ed. 1996) which provides in relevant part: 
(d) Notwithstanding the limitation of liability in subsection (a) above, Borrower 
shall be fully personally liable for all of Borrower's obligations under the Loan 
Documents, and Lender's recourse to the personal assets of Borrower and its 
constituent partners shall not be limited in any way by this Section X, if Borrower 
(A) attempts to prevent or delay the foreclosure of the Mortgage or any other 
collateral for the Loan or the exercise of any of lender's other remedies under any 
Loan Document, or (B) claims that any Loan Document is invalid or unenforceable 
and such a claims [sic] will have the effect of preventing or delaying such 
foreclosure or any other exercise of remedies. Without limitation, Borrower shall be 
deemed to have attempted to prevent or delay such foreclosure or other exercise of 
remedies if (i) Borrower files a petition under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 
11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (the "Bankruptcy Code), as amended, (ii) Borrower opposes 
a motion by Lender to lift an automatic stay imposed pursuant to 11 U.S.c. § 362 
and for leave to foreclose the Mortgage and any other collateral for the Loan, or (iii) 
Borrower files a proposed plan of reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code under 
which Lender would receive (x) less than all of the Property or (y) a lien 
encumbering less than all of the Property or (z) a lien having a lower priority or 
terms less favorable to Lender than the Mortgage as it existed immediately prior to 
the filing of a petition under the Bankruptcy Code. . .. 
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commonplace.212 Although they raise difficult legal and policy issues, 
the strength of the economy through the 1990s has generally prevented 
lenders from having to enforce them, and so there is, as of yet, little case 
law on their enforceability.213 
Bankruptcy-contingent guaranties are the clearest example of 
"pure-leverage guaranties."214 Their function is not to assure an addi-
tional means of repayment of the debt should the borrower default. 
Rather, they ensure that the borrower will make every effort to live up to 
its contractual promises and will not hamper the creditor in its efforts to 
enforce its rights and recover its debt. Bankruptcy-contingent guaranties 
are most widely used in three contexts. First, they may be used in 
financing for closely-held businesses, where a single or small number of 
shareholders, members, or partners own and control the borrower. Sec-
ond, they are used in commercial real estate lending?15 Third, they are 
increasingly common as an adjunct to creating "bankruptcy remote" 
entities in securitized financing transactions. 
The challenges to bankruptcy-contingent guaranties are likely to 
come from several different directions. There will be arguments that 
they are unenforceable as a matter of state law because they violate pub-
212. While conversations with practitioners confirm that bankruptcy-contingent guaranties are 
now a standard part of commercial transactions, there is no real data on the prevalence of these 
devices. Indeed, to the extent a bankruptcy-contingent guaranty serves its purpose, there never 
will be a judicial record of its existence. Some indication of the growth of the bankruptcy-
contingent guaranty may be found in the secondary literature. There are no references to 
springing or exploding guaranties in the WESTLAW TP-ALL database (all texts and periodicals) 
prior to 1996; four in 1996; six in 1997; 10 in 1998; and ten in the first half of 2000. Only in the 
last three or four years have form books started including bankruptcy-contingent guaranties. See 
sources cited supra note 210. 
213. See infra at Part IV.B.2 (discussing cases on bankruptcy-contingent nonrecourse carve-
outs). 
214. The term is borrowed from Professor Westbrook, but note an important difference from 
the context in which he used it - to refer to any insider guarantee from a guarantor who is " not 
likely to be able to offset any shortfall in the debtor's performance." See Westbrook, Two 
Thoughts, supra note 122, at 80. Here, the point is that, regardless of whether or not the guarantor 
is solvent, the entire purpose of the guaranty is to control behavior rather than to provide 
additional financial resources. 
215. See, e.g., Joshua Stein, Nonrecourse Carveouts: How Far is Far Enough?, REAL EST. 
REv. (Summer 1997); Frederick Z. Lodge, et aI., Bankruptcy Remote Structures in Mortgage 
Loans, PROB. & PRoP., June 10, 1996,49 Russell L. Munsch, et al., The Changing Commercial 
Real Estate Environment - Are Commercial Real Estate Workouts Dead?, (Dallas Bar Ass'n, Nov. 
5, 1997) (visited June 1999), available in <http://www.munsch.comlhottopics!environmentl. 
html> ("The standardization of commercial real estate loan documentation nationwide, as well as 
structured impediments to the commencement of insolvency proceedings and bankruptcy cases 
(including the proliferation of 'springing guaranties'), may adversely impact upon the willingness 
or ability of commercial real estate owners to seek the protection of these forums."); Kenneth M. 
Block & Jeffery B. Steiner, Stays of 'Springing Guaranties',' How Creditor Can Enforce Rights 
Against Non-Debtor Guarantor, N.Y .L.J., July 17, 1996, at 5 (stating that springing guaranties 
"are common in real estate loans and financings"). 
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lic policy. They will be challenged in bankruptcy cases, where debtors 
and guarantors will seek temporary and permanent injunctions against 
their enforcement. These attacks will go beyond the guarantor's liabil-
ity, as debtors seek to have lenders' claims equitably subordinated on 
account of the leverage created by the guaranty. In the following sec-
tions, I review the sparse caselaw on springing and exploding guaranties, 
then examine the fiduciary duty and bankruptcy policy arguments 
against their enforcement. 
2. CASE LAW 
Only two reported cases address bankruptcy-contingent guaranties, 
with each case structured as a nonrecourse carve-out in a real estate 
mortgage. Both found the guaranties enforceable. Consider first the 
Fourth Circuit's decision in FDIC v. Prince George Corp.216 After fore-
closure, the FDIC sued a joint venturer for a deficiency judgment on the 
joint venture's nonrecourse mortgage note. The nonrecourse clause had 
a carve-out providing that the note would become recourse "to the extent 
that Holder's rights of recourse to the property which is then subject to 
the Mortgage are suspended, reduced, or impaired by or as a result of 
any act, omission or misrepresentation. . . or by or as a result of any 
case, action, suit or proceeding to which [the borrower or any other lia-
ble party] voluntarily becomes a party."217 In essence, the carve-out was 
a springing guaranty by the joint venturers. 
The district court held that the borrower's bankruptcy filing was an 
"act" triggering liability under this provision, but for "policy reasons", 
the court declined to hold that the borrower's actions in resisting the 
foreclosure itself gave rise to liability.218 The court stated that if the 
"lender intended to use the threat of a deficiency judgment as an incen-
tive to induce PGC to give up its right to defend against foreclosure, 
such an extreme position should have been more clearly stated."219 The 
district court thus awarded damages based on the sixty-three days by 
which foreclosure had been delayed by the borrower's bankruptcy 
filing,z20 
On appeal, the guarantor argued that the borrower had a statutory 
right to bankruptcy protection and that any waiver of that right was void 
on public policy grounds,z21 The Fourth Circuit rejected that argument, 
noting that the contract "did not prohibit PGC from resorting to bank-
216. 58 F.3d 1041 (4th Cir. 1995). 
217. Jd. at 1044. 
218. See id. at 1045. 
219. See id. at 1047. 
220. Jd. 
221. See id. at 1046. 
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ruptcy; it merely provided that if POC took certain actions it would for-
feit its exemption from liability for any deficiency."222 Moreover, the 
court held that the unambiguous language imposed deficiency liability 
for "any act" that impaired the lender's recourse rights, language that 
includes the borrower's defense of the foreclosure proceeding.223 The 
Fourth Circuit therefore remanded for a determination of liability based 
on the delays caused by both the bankruptcy case and the borrower's 
defense of the foreclosure action. 
The second case that considers springing guaranties is similar. In 
First Nationwide Bank v. Brookhaven Realty AsSOCS.,224 the debtor real 
estate partnership had entered into a nonrecourse mortgage with a carve-
out providing that the partners would be individually liable should the 
partnership ever file for bankruptcy. After default, the partnership filed 
for bankruptcy, although the case was later dismissed. The lender then 
sued the partners, who argued that the bankruptcy-contingent liability 
was unenforceable under the Bankruptcy Code's prohibition of ipso 
facto clauses.225 The court rejected this argument on numerous grounds, 
including the facts that the ipso facto prohibition applies only to execu-
tory contracts, not mortgages, and that once the bankruptcy cases had 
been dismissed, the enforceability of the agreement was a matter of state 
law rather than bankruptcy law. 226 
While both of these cases enforced bankruptcy-contingent liabili-
ties, they should provide little comfort to lenders. In each case, the 
bankruptcy proceeding had been dismissed prior to the initiation of the 
guaranty suit, making these poor candidates to test the robustness of 
springing guaranties in the face of a strong bankruptcy policy argument. 
Moreover, both cases were single-asset realty cases, meaning that the 
borrowers had few, if any, creditors other than the mortgagee. As a 
result, state law fiduciary duties that might have been owed to creditors 
were not relevant either. In other words, these were the easy cases, to 
which the arguments against bankruptcy-contingent guaranties do not 
readily apply. 
3. FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
Perhaps the most obvious argument against springing and explod-
ing guaranties - on appropriate facts227 - is that they are intended to 
create a conflict between the guarantor's self-interest and the fiduciary 
222. [d. 
223. See id. at 1048. 
224. 637 N.Y.S.2d 418 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). 
225. See II U.S.C. § 365(e) (1999). 
226. See Brookhaven Realty, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 421. 
227. This argument is factually inapposite in single asset real estate cases like Prince George 
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duties owed to all of the borrower's creditors as the borrower becomes 
insolvent. From this observation, it would seem only a small step to the 
conclusion that bankruptcy-contingent guaranties are unenforceable. 
Breach of fiduciary duty is a tort, and it is elementary contract law that 
an agreement intended to induce the commission of a tort violates public 
policy and is not enforceable.228 This argument does not rely on the 
Bankruptcy Code or bankruptcy policy. It simply asserts that a spring-
ing or exploding guaranty is not enforceable as a matter of state law. 
This is consistent with the traditional view of the duties of corpo-
rate directors. Courts have routinely held that contracts limiting the abil-
ity of corporate directors to exercise their independent judgment are 
unenforceable.229 While this argument may prevail in some jurisdic-
tions, the general victory of the contractarian view of fiduciary duties is 
likely, in many cases (depending on the jurisdiction and the type of busi-
ness entity involved), to prevent it from applying. The law of business 
organizations now largely eschews mandatory terms - even when it 
comes to fiduciary duties.z30 Mandatory terms have been derided as 
ineffective, because they can be avoided in many cases by explicit char-
ter or contractual choices,231 by organizing in another jurisdiction that 
does not impose the same mandatory term,232 or by choosing another 
Corp. and Brookhaven Realty, where there are few, if any, creditors other than the mortgage 
lender asserting the guaranty liability. 
228. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 192 ("A promise to commit a tort or to 
induce the commission of a tort is unenforceable on grounds of public policy."). A related 
argument that could be made, yet would likely fail, is that the threat to exercise a springing 
guaranty violates a fiduciary duty owed by the lender. While it is generally true that a lender owes 
no fiduciary duties to its borrowers, to the extent that a creditor is able to exercise control over a 
particular decision made by a debtor's board of directors, the creditor may be found to have 
fiduciary duties with regard to that decision. See, e.g., Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc. v. Hessen (In re 
Teltronics), 29 B.R. 139, 170-71 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) (''The general rule that a creditor is not a 
fiduciary of his debtor is not without exception. In the rare circumstance where a creditor 
exercises such control over the decision-making processes of the debtor as amounts to a 
domination of its will, he may be held accountable for his actions under a fiduciary standard."). 
229. See, e.g., 18B AM. JUR. 2d Corporation § 1487 ("A contract by a director of a corporation 
that limits or restricts him in the free exercise of his judgment or discretion, or that places him 
under direct and powerful inducements to diregard his duties to the corporation, its creditors, and 
other stockholders in the management of corporate affairs, is against public policy and void.") 
(citing cases); WILUAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LlABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFlCERS AND 
DIRECTORS (5th ed. 1993) § 4-20 (citing cases). 
230. This is a far from settled issue, and the literature addressing the wisdom or folly of 
permitting fiduciary duties to be waived in the business setting has become immense. A primary 
resource on the debate in the corporate arena is Symposium: Contractual Freedom in Corporate 
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989). A recent round in the debate, focusing on partnership and 
other unincorporated entities, can be found in Symposium on the Future of the Unincorporated 
Firm, 54 WASH. & LEE. L. REv. 387 (1997). 
231. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Repose to 
the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REv. I, 10 (1990). 
232. See id. at II. 
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form of organization.233 They have also been criticized as inefficient, 
because they require investors to acquiesce to a relationship whose terms 
they do not believe are optimal. 234 
For the moment, these criticisms seem to have largely carried the 
day.235 In New York, for example, the duty of loyalty does not prohibit 
self-dealing if the personal interest is disclosed and approved by the dis-
interested directors?36 Delaware has a similar provision.237 In the con-
text of close corporations, courts have applied somewhat higher 
standards of loyalty as between majority and minority shareholders, 
given the position of dependence that minority shareholders find them-
selves in?38 However, there is no reason to expect these higher stan-
dards to apply when courts consider the fiduciary duties owed by 
shareholder managers of an insolvent close corporation to the firm's 
creditors. And in some jurisdictions, such as Delaware, the discretion of 
board members or managing shareholders in a close corporation may be 
modified or controlled by written agreement of a majority of the 
shareholders?39 
This trend toward waivable fiduciary duties is also apparent in 
recent statutory enactments governing non corporate business entities. 
For example, under the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1995) 
and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1994), a partner or manager's 
duty of loyalty may not be waived; however, the partnership or operat-
ing agreement may "identify specific types or categories of activities 
that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasona-
ble."240 The Uniform Acts, of course, are not binding on the states, and 
233. Id. 
234. See generally id. 
235. See, e.g., David L. Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability 
Company: How Should Courts and Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary 
Responsibility and Securities Regulation for the Limited Liability Company, 51 OKLA. L. REv. 
427 (1998). 
A number of state statutes have attempted to create an entity [the limited liability 
company] that is entirely a creature of contract and not bound by any mandatory 
fiduciary duties whatsoever. Some commentators argue that the abolition of 
mandatory fiduciary duties will make LLCs the entity of choice among business 
forms, including closely held and publicly traded companies. Indeed, Delaware has 
paved the way for this eventuality by removing any obstacles for trading LLCs on 
the secondary markets and by explicitly basing its LLC laws on the contractarian 
model of the corporation. 
Id. at 459 (citations omitted). 
236. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713(b) (McKinney 1986). 
237. See DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 144 (1991). 
238. See Kathleen D. Fuentes, Comment, Limited Liability Companies and Opting-Out of 
Liability: A New Standard for Fiduciary Duties?, 27 SETON HALL. L. REv. 1023, 1043-46 (1997). 
239. See 8 DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 350-354 (1999). 
240. § 103(b)(2)(i) (1995); REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr (R.U.P.A.) § 103(b)(3)(i) 
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some states, most notably Delaware, have loosened the restrictions even 
further?41 
The defense of bankruptcy-contingent guaranties under this con-
tractarian approach is simple enough. The question is whether the 
potential conflict is to be viewed from an ex ante perspective, from 
which the "conflict" is a deliberate decision by the corporation to bind 
its managers to a particular approach to insolvency, or from an ex post 
perspective, which examines the situation as a conflict of interest arising 
at the point of insolvency. Viewed ex post, the decision to stay out of 
bankruptcy may be a breach of the duty of loyalty - unless it is per-
missible for the parties to enter into a defined modification of the duty of 
loyalty in specified future circumstances, where that modification is in 
the corporation's interest at the time it is executed. What looks like a 
conflict of duties at the time of insolvency is really a process for bond-
ing the entity's decision makers to ensure that they will carry out those 
acts which, at the time of financing, the entity has determined best 
advance its goals. 
As a matter of corporate law (but not necessarily bankruptcy law), 
this argument seems likely to prevail. While some early cases held that 
a director could not enter into a contract that could create a personal 
interest in conflict with the director's fiduciary duty to the corpora-
tion,242 this is no longer the prevailing law. In most states today, a cor-
poration may enter into a contract with a director if a disinterested 
quorum and voting majority of directors supports the transaction, or if 
the director shows the fairness of the transaction. Conflicts are not per 
se impermissible, and if appropriate disinterested parties (directors or a 
judge) believe the transaction is in the corporation's interest, there is no 
violation. 
Put in this light, bankruptcy-contingent guaranties seem unobjec-
tionable. It is hard to argue that an insider is taking advantage of the 
firm when he assumes the risk of liability for the firm's debt in order to 
(1997). Similarly, the acts provide that the operating agreement may not "unreasonably reduce 
the duty of care", § 103(b)(3) (1995) and § 1O(b)(4) (1997), nor "eliminate the obligation of good 
faith and fair dealing ... but the [operating agreement or partnership agreement] may determine 
the standards by which the performance of the obligation is to be measured, if the standards are 
not manifestly unreasonable." ULLCA § 103(b)(4) (1975); R.U.P.A. § 103(b)(5) (1997). 
241. See DEL. CODE § 18-1101(c) (1999), which states 
To the extent that, at law or in equity, a member or manager or other person has 
duties (including fiduciary duties) and liabilities relating thereto to a limited liability 
company or to another member or manager ... (2) the member's or manager's or 
other person's duties and liabilities may be expanded or restricted by provisions in a 
limited liability company agreement. 
242. See JAMES D. Cox, et al., CORPORATIONS, § 10.12-14. 
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secure financing for the firm.243 As one court has said in a different 
context, the fiduciary duty of a controlling shareholder "does not require 
self-sacrifice. "244 
Under modem standards of fiduciary duty, it seems that a springing 
or exploding guaranty can be validated by vote of the board or subse-
quent judicial ratification. In some contexts, such as the LLC or partner-
ship setting, the validation may occur through provisions in the 
organizing documents. 
However, the fact that a manager's fiduciary duties to other equity 
holders are contractually defined, modified, or waived does not neces-
sarily settle the extent of the fiduciary duties owed to creditors upon 
insolvency. After all, the creditors were not parties to the modification 
provision, nor are the shareholders or directors who ratified it the credi-
tors' representatives. Indeed, statutory provisions governing the modifi-
cation of fiduciary duties in the LLC and partnership context explicitly 
state that "the partnership [operating] agreement may not. . . (10) 
restrict rights of third parties under this [Act]."245 It is arguable, there-
fore, that even under a contractarian approach to fiduciary duties, the 
manager should not be able to enter into a bankruptcy-contingent guar-
anty, which attempts to modify the incentives that will be faced by the 
manager at a future time when he or she will owe fiduciary duties to 
creditors?46 
On closer inspection, however, this argument also begins to lose 
243. Most cases addressing conflict of interest situations involve a fiduciary dealing with the 
corporation in a manner that results in a personal benefit for the fiduciary. Thus, cases on the 
corporate opportunity doctrine or excess compensation or self-dealing are commonplace. In the 
bankruptcy-contingent guaranty context, however, the insider does not gain at the expense of the 
corporation by entering into the guaranty; thus, most of the existing case law seems inapposite. 
The closest analogy is to cases that address whether it is a breach of fiduciary duty for an insider 
to cause an insolvent corporation to make payments on a debt owed to, or guarantied by, the 
insider. See McCoid, supra note 142, at 816-21 (discussing cases that have addressed whether 
such payments are constructively fraudulent or reversible on "equity" grounds). At least these 
cases present situations where an insider entered into a contract from which the insider could only 
lose in order to benefit the corporation. Courts have held that later actions taken to mitigate the 
insider's loss, at the expense of other creditors, could be a breach of fiduciary duties. Bankruptcy-
contingent guaranties would seem to pose an even stronger case for condemnation. The insider 
preference cases concern a question that is purely distributional (which creditors will be paid from 
a given pool of assets), while the bankruptcy-contingent guaranty may prevent the firm from 
maximizing its assets, distributional questions aside. 
244. Getty Oil v. Skelly Oil Co, 267 A.2d 883, 888 (Del. 1970). 
245. R.V.PA § 103(b)(lO) (1996); V.L.L.CA § 103(b)(7) (1996). 
246. I am not addressing the fiduciary duties of the manager of the debtor in possession after a 
bankruptcy filing, which are a matter of bankruptcy law, and presumably cannot be modified by a 
pre-bankruptcy contractual arrangement. Moreover, the argument against springing and 
exploding guaranties is not that they subvert the management of the bankruptcy case because once 
the guarantor has "bitten the bullet" and caused the borrower to file for bankruptcy, the guaranty, 
if enforceable, is indistinguishable from an ordinary insider guaranty. The threat from contingent 
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some of its strength. Fiduciary duties run to the creditors upon insol-
vency because they become the residual claimants.247 This is not true if 
the borrower's primary debt has been guarantied by its equity holders. 
If an insider has guarantied the borrower's primary debt, the insider 
remains one of the primary residual claimants until the guarantied debt 
is repaid.248 
Nonetheless, an insider subject to a springing guaranty faces a basic 
conflict of interest, and should therefore have to excuse herself from 
voting on whether the firm should file for bankruptcy. While the fact 
that the insider is also in the position of residual claimant mitigates the 
conflict to some extent, it does not make the director disinterested. If 
the insider does not abstain, then it is likely that the insider could be held 
liable for breach of fiduciary duty absent a showing of the fairness of the 
decision made. 
4. BANKRUPTCY POLICY 
As noted in Part ill.B., insider guaranties can help create appropri-
ate incentives to keep firms from filing unwarranted bankruptcy cases. 
This is also the purpose of a bankruptcy-contingent guaranty. It might 
even seem that the contingent guaranty, through its tailored structure, 
would be superior to an unconditional guaranty. The bankruptcy-contin-
gent guaranty, however, is less accurate in its incentives than an uncon-
ditional guaranty, creating an inappropriate overdeterrence. 
Consider once again our hypothetical firm, with a liquidation value 
of $70 and a reorganization value of $80.249 The firm has $100 in 
unsecured debt, $50 of which has been protected with a springing guar-
anty and $50 of which is not guarantied. Clearly the firm should be 
reorganized, in which case creditors will lose only $20 rather than $30. 
From the insider's perspective, however, the choice is between nonban-
kruptcy liquidation with no personal liability, and bankruptcy reorgani-
zation with a personal liability of $10.250 In other words, the incentives 
created by a bankruptcy-contingent guaranty may prevent efficient bank-
ruptcy filings.251 
guaranties exists before any bankruptcy filing - the threat is that the bankruptcy case will never 
be initiated. 
247. See supra Part U.B.1. 
248. See supra Part III.A. 
249. See supra text accompanying notes 120-122. 
250. One half of the $80 reorganization value, or $40, will be applied to the $50 in guarantied 
debt. 
251. Note that this same disincentive does not exist when the insider has entered into an 
unconditional guaranty. The choice would then be between nonbankruptcy liquidation, which 
would result in personal liability for a $15 deficiency ($50 owed to the guarantied creditor, less 
$35 share of liquidation value), and a bankruptcy reorganization with personal liability of just $10 
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Moreover, there is reason to be concerned that waivers of post-
default rights may be entered into even when they are not, ex ante, effi-
cient. Particularly where these waivers are used to signal creditworthi-
ness, as insider guaranties are, it is possible that borrowers will decline 
to ask for efficient terms for fear of labeling themselves as unworthy 
borrowers.252 While this risk exists with bankruptcy waivers and insider 
guaranties in general, the problem is exacerbated in the case of springing 
or exploding guaranties: At least in the case of an outright waiver53 or 
unconditional guaranty, the insider has efficient incentives regarding the 
bankruptcy case. Thus, once the firm is in financial trouble the insider 
can be expected to negotiate with the waiver holder to relinquish the 
waiver for some reasonable quid pro quo.254 In the case of a springing 
guaranty, however, the insider's conflict usually means that there is no 
one in a position to act on behalf of the creditor body. Thus, the collec-
tive action problem is likely to cripple renegotiation. In this way, bank-
ruptcy-contingent guaranties are more inimical to the goals of 
bankruptcy than a simple waiver of bankruptcy rights which the debtor 
could seek to renegotiate without the in terrorem effect of the springing 
liability. 
If springing guaranties violate a fundamental bankruptcy policy -
preventing firms that would benefit from reorganization from filing and 
defeating the Bankruptcy Code's ability to cure the collective action 
problem faced by creditors - there is still the question of what legal 
doctrine, if any, a bankruptcy court could use to bar enforcement of the 
contract. As shown above, it seems difficult to argue that the guaranty is 
unenforceable under state law, and obligations that are binding under 
state law are normally enforceable in bankruptcy. 
However, a bankruptcy court could enjoin suit on a bankruptcy-
($50 guarantied debt less $40 share of the reorganized firm). Note as well that the provision at 
issue in Prince George Corp. avoided the perverse incentives attendant on many springing 
guaranties, because it imposed deficiency liability only "to the extent" that prohibited acts 
impaired the FDIC's recourse to its collateral. F.D.I.C. v. Prince George Corp., 58 F.3d 104, 104 
(4th Cir. 1995). Thus, the damages were measured by the interest lost and expenses incurred 
directly from the borrower's acts. This is dramatically different - and far more defensible - in 
its effects from a provision that would make the borrower's principals liable for the entire 
deficiency, regardless of the actual harm caused by the borrower's resistance. 
252. See Marshall E. Tracht, Renegotiation and Secured Credit: Explaining the Equity of 
Redemption, 52 V AND. L. REv. 599, 636-41 (1999). 
253. Although I have argued for the enforceability of bankruptcy waivers, I am not optimistic 
that courts will adopt this position. See Tracht, Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers, supra note 152. 
Accordingly, throughout this analysis I assume that waivers of the right to file for bankruptcy are 
void on "public policy" grounds. Nonetheless, even if courts determine that bankruptcy waivers 
are enforceable, for the reasons expressed in this paragraph I believe that springing and exploding 
guaranties are suspect. 
254. See Tracht, Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers, supra note 152, at 330. 
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contingent guaranty using its general equitable powers under section 
105.255 These powers are limited to actions "necessary or appropriate to 
carry out the provisions of' the Bankruptcy Code, so injunctive relief of 
this sort is not possible except insofar as it is in aid of other specific 
bankruptcy provisions,256 Equitable relief is consistent with the policies 
and provisions of the Code in these cases. For example, section 362 of 
the Code, the automatic stay, enjoins creditor actions against the debtor 
or its property, but does not enjoin suits against third parties.257 None-
theless, courts have repeatedly entered temporary injunctions protecting 
third parties (such as insider guarantors) to carry out the intent of the 
automatic stay.258 Similarly, section 365(e) of the Bankruptcy Code 
generally invalidates provisions that grant rights against the debtor upon 
the filing of bankruptcy, generally called "ipso facto clauses."259 This 
provision applies only to "an executory contract or unexpired lease of 
the debtor," and thus would not invalidate a bankruptcy-contingent guar-
anty,260 However, where a contract against a third party has the effect of 
creating additional leverage over the debtor upon the filing of the bank-
ruptcy case, as a bankruptcy-contingent guaranty does, such a contract 
would seem to fall within the intended functions of section 365(e). 
In short, bankruptcy courts should be willing to invoke their author-
ity under section 105 to further the policies effectuated by sections 362 
and 365(e)(1) by temporarily enjoining suits on bankruptcy-contingent 
guaranties. The reasoning is consistent with, but more persuasive than, 
other cases in which bankruptcy courts have granted temporary injunc-
255. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) provides, in relevant part: "The court may issue any order, process, or 
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." 
256. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) (stating that 
authority under section 105 is limited because "whatever equitable powers remain in the 
bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code"). 
257. See. e.g., Credit Alliance Corp. v. Williams, 851 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1988). 
258. It generally has been held that bankruptcy courts do have the power to temporarily enjoin 
suits against third parties, such as guarantors, where the injunction is necessary to facilitate the 
reorganization. Cases in which such injunctions have been granted to protect insider guarantors 
include: In re Third Eighty-Ninth Assocs., 138 B.R. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Litchfield Co. of S.c. 
L.P. v. Anchor Bank (In re Litchfield Co. of S.c. Ltd. Partnership), 135 B.R. 797 (W.D.N.C. 
1992); In re Lomas Fin Corp., 117 B.R. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n. of 
Little Rock v. Pettit, 12 B.R. 147 (E.D. Ark. 1981); In re F.T.L., Inc., 152 B.R. 61 (Bankr. 
E.D.Va. 1993); Codfish Corp. v. FDIC (In re Codfish Corp.), 97 B.R. 132 (Bankr. D. P.R. 1988): 
In re Kasual Kreations. 54 B.R. 915 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); In re Northlake Bldg Partners, 41 
B.R. 231 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984). For discussions of the temporary injunction issue, see Paul H. 
Deutch, Note, Expanding the Automatic Stay: Protecting Nondebtors in Single Asset Bankruptcy 
Cases, 2 AM. BANKR.INST. L. REv. 453 (1994); G.H. Ishii-Chang, Litigation and Bankruptcy: The 
Dilemma of the Codefendant Stay, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 257 (1989); Elizabeth H. Winchester, 
Note, Expanding the Bankruptcy Code: The Use of Section 362 and Section 105 to Protect Solvent 
Executives of Debtor Corporations, 58 BROOKLYN L. REv. 929 (1992); Zaretsky, supra note 105. 
259. See 11 U.S.c. § 365(e)(1) (1986). 
260. 11 U.S.c. § 362 (1986). 
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tions against the enforcement of insider guaranties on grounds that such 
suits threatened the bankruptcy proceedings.261 The argument is more 
persuasive because of the inappropriate incentives created by the bank-
ruptcy-contingent nature of the liability. 
A more difficult question will arise when the court must consider 
whether to permit the bankruptcy-contingent liability to be discharged 
pursuant to a bankruptcy plan.262 Assuming that such injunctions are 
not barred by section 524(e), a matter on which courts are split,263 
261. See supra cases cited at note 258. 
262. A more difficult question is whether a permanent injunction should be granted if the 
bankruptcy of the borrower does not result in a confirmed plan of reorganization. If the 
bankruptcy case is converted to Chapter 7 or dismissed. that is a strong indication that the filing 
was inefficient. and it does not seem to threaten - and indeed may support - bankruptcy policy to 
enforce personal liability triggered by the inappropriate recourse to bankruptcy. This is consistent 
with the decisions in Prince George and Brookhaven. See supra notes 217. 225. If bankruptcy 
waivers were enforceable. then an absolute bar on bankruptcy-contingent liability would make 
sense. If bankruptcy waivers are not enforceable. the costs of disabling this second-best option 
may be significant. 
Yet. conversion or dismissal does not prove the case should not have been filed or even that 
the case did not benefit creditors. Moreover. given the uncertainty of any bankruptcy case. the 
risk of such liability would deter some efficient cases. The distorted incentive created by the 
bankruptcy-contingent liability. see supra text accompanying notes 249 to 251. argues for their 
outright prohibition. and so relief should be available to the guarantor even absent confirmation of 
a reorganization plan. The appropriate limitation on release of a bankruptcy-contingent liability 
should not be whether or not a plan is confirmed. but whether the case was filed in good faith. 
Courts have properly held that a bankruptcy case filed simply in order to protect guarantors is 
filed in bad faith. See, e.g., In re Humble Place Joint Venture. 836 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1991); In re 
North Vermont Associates. L.P .• 165 B.R. 340 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1994). Again. this appears largely 
consistent with Prince George and Brookhaven. situations in which the bankruptcy cases were 
quickly dismissed. See supra notes 217. 225. It seems appropriate for state courts to leave 
discharge of the liability up to the bankruptcy court. which is in a much better position to 
determine whether the petition was filed in good faith. 
263. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have rejected the authority of the bankruptcy courts to 
permanently enjoin actions against third parties (effectively discharging the third parties' 
obligations). relying largely on section 524(e). which provides: "Except as provided in subsection 
(a)(3) of this section, discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other 
entity on. or the property of any other entity for. such debt." II U.S.C. § 524(e) (1999). See 
Resorts InCI v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss). 67 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1995); American 
Hardwoods. Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re American Hardwoods. Inc.). 885 F.2d 621 (9th 
Cir. 1989); Underhill v. Royal. 769 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Landsing Diversified 
Properties-II v. First Nat'! Bank & Trust Co. (In re Western Real Estate Fund). 922 F.2d 592. 601-
02 (lOth Cir. 1990) (holding that section 524(e) prohibits discharge of third party). Most courts 
and commentators disagree. See, e.g., Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 
1995) (bankruptcy court has "related to" jurisdiction over creditors' suits against debtor's insurer, 
but lacks power to permanently enjoin such suits); In re Specialty Equip. Inc. 3 F.3d 1043 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (stating. in dicta. that while section 524(e) provides that the discharge does not release 
third parties. it "does not purport to limit or restrain the power of the bankruptcy court to 
otherwise grant a release to a third party."); SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert GrouP. Inc. (In re 
Drexel Burnham Lambert Group. Inc.). 960 F.2d 285. 293 (2d Cir. 1992) ("In bankruptcy cases. a 
court may enjoin a creditor from suing a third party. provided the injunction plays an important 
part in the debtor's reorganization plan." (citing A.H. Robins»; MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville 
Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.). 837 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988); Menard Sanford v. Mabey (In re 
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should a permanent injunction be permitted over the objection of a cred-
itor holding a bankruptcy-contingent guaranty? Even in those courts 
that permit them, permanent injunctions protecting third parties are 
viewed as extraordinary relief requiring unusually powerful justifica-
tions.264 However, a bankruptcy-contingent guaranty is not, at its core, 
an obligation of a third party or a contract of financial assurance; it is a 
bonding device used to control the business decisions of the debtor, with 
financial liability imposed on the principals as a penalty for breach.265 
As such, it is appropriate for a bankruptcy court to enjoin enforcement 
as part of a reorganization plan. 
Although the springing guaranties were enforced in Prince George 
and Brookhaven Realty, these cases are consistent with the arguments 
advanced here. In each case, the debtor had no real prospect of reorga-
nizing and the bankruptcy case had been quickly dismissed prior to the 
A.H. Robins Co., Inc.), 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989); In re 
AOV Indus., Inc. 792 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Ropes & Gray (In re 
Monarch Capital Corp.), 173 B.R. 31 (D. Mass. 1994), aff'd, 65 F.3d 973 (1st Cir. 1995); In re 
Heron, Burchette, Ruckert and Rothwell, 148 B.R. 660 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1992); see generally 
Hydee Feldstein, Reinterpreting Bankruptcy Code §524(e), 22 CAL. BANKR. J. 25 (1994); Peter E. 
Meltzer, Getting Out of Jail Free: Can the Bankruptcy Plan Process Be Used to Release 
Nondebtor Parties?, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1997) (arguing that section 105 does not authorize 
bankruptcy courts to enjoin actions against third parties). 
Even if such permanent injunctions are within the power of the bankruptcy court, this power 
is seldom if ever used to protect guarantors. Cases decline to confirm reorganization plans on the 
grounds that they impermissibly purport to release the liability of third party guarantors or 
codebtors. See American Hardwoods Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp, (In re American Hardwoods), 
885 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc., 113 B.R. 610 (9th Cir. BAP 
1990); In re Boston Harbor Marina Co., 157 B.R. 726 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993); In re Bennett 
Paper Corp., 65 B.R. 518 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1986); Bill Roderick Distrib. Inc. v. A.J. Mackay Co. 
(In re A.J. Mackay Co.), 50 B.R. 756 (D. Utah 1985). In the only case I have been able to find in 
which the bankruptcy court may (the published appellate decision is unclear) have confirmed such 
a plan over the timely objection of a creditor, the order was reversed on appeal. See Mellon Bank 
v. M.K. Siegel, 96 B.R. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 
For analysis of the propriety of permanently enjoining actions against third parties, see Ralph 
Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions and Complex Litigation: A Critical Reappraisal of Non-Debtor 
Releases in Chapter I I Reorganizations, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 959; Meltzer, supra; Feldstein, 
supra; Kenneth M. Lewis, When are Nondebtors Really Entitled to a Discharge: Setting the 
Record Straight on Johns-Manville and A.H. Robins, 3 J. BANKR. L. & !>RAe. 163 (1994); Judith 
R. Starr, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction to Release Insiders from Creditor Claim in Corporate 
Reorganizations, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 485 (1993); Howard C. Buschmann ill & Sean P. Madden, 
The Power and Propriety of Bankruptcy Court Intervention in Actions Between Nondebtors, 47 
Bus. LAW. 913 (1992). 
264. Such injunctions have been permitted primarily when the injunction was necessary to the 
reorganization. In those cases, the creditor(s) being enjoined were to receive payment in full 
under the plan of reorganization, and the vast majority of creditor(s) being enjoined consented to 
the injunction. See In re Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930 (Bankr. w.O. Mo. 1994) 
(gathering and discussing cases). 
265. I use the word "penalty" carefully here to distinguish from "damages." The principal 
objection to the bankruptcy-contingent guaranty is that the liability is not measured by the loss 
occasioned by the bankruptcy filing itself. 
558 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LA W REVIEW [Vol. 54:497 
state law suit seeking to impose personal liability. As the court noted in 
Brookhaven Realty, "The policies of providing a debtor with a fresh start 
and an opportunity to reorganize its finances are not present in a foreclo-
sure proceeding."266 
It remains to be seen whether, given a viable debtor, bankruptcy-
contingent liability would be found invalid on "public policy" grounds 
or as an unenforceable penalty. Moreover, we have not yet seen a case 
where a bankruptcy court, rather than a state court, has been asked to 
rule on the enforceability of a springing guaranty or to grant an injunc-
tion barring its enforcement in order to protect the bankruptcy 
proceeding. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The treatment of insider guaranties is not a minor technical ques-
tion. It is one that has significant ramifications for the overall function-
ing of bankruptcy law for many small businesses. In a recent article on 
the interactions of corporate and bankruptcy law, Professor David Skeel 
observed that the forms of managerial control used during the healthy 
life of a business organization are inherently linked to the type of bank-
ruptcy system available to that entity.267 The U.S. system of corporate 
law can be characterized as one of ex post controls.268 While countries 
like Japan and Germany have a system of close monitoring by share-
holder/creditors (ex ante controls on management),269 the U.S. system 
combines dispersed shareholding with the threat of takeover (and the 
replacement of management) if a firm is poorly managed?70 Yet take-
overs involve high leverage, and the potential threat of a takeover may 
induce a firm to borrow heavily.271 The ex post form of governance 
therefore increases the risk of bankruptcy for firms that have going con-
cern value and should not be liquidated?72 Given that this form of cor-
porate control involves a high risk of financial distress, it makes sense 
that it should be paired with a bankruptcy system that keeps manage-
ment in place and is generous in its efforts to preserve going concern 
value - a system like Chapter 11.273 
This description of the u.S. system of corporate governance, how-
ever, is accurate only insofar as we are discussing public companies. It 
266. 637 N.Y.S. 2d 418, 421 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) 
267. See Skeel, Evolutionary Theory, supra note 24. 
268. See id. at 1339-46. 
269. See id. at 1337-39, 1343-46. 
270. See id. 
271. See id. at 1339-40. 
272. See id. at 1340. 
273. See id. at 1340-43. 
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must be modified in important respects to deal with small business, 
where ownership is concentrated and closely tied to management and the 
divide between personal assets and business assets is porous. Takeovers 
are not a means of disciplining small business managers, who control the 
stock of their companies, nor is firing a credible threat when the busi-
ness depends on the personal knowledge and abilities of the manager. It 
may also be too costly for creditors to monitor small businesses, keeping 
a steady watch for signs of impending trouble.274 Thus, creditors tum to 
a more cost-effective means of monitoring and policing the firm: the 
insider guaranty. Supervision by the insider guarantor is less expensive 
than monitoring by creditors, and will be superior to monitoring by an 
insider not subject to a guaranty because the insider-guarantor is a 
residual claimhholder in a way that a simple equity holder is not. 275 
The 1978 Bankruptcy Code brought small and large businesses 
under a common bankruptcy framework.276 However, the different 
mechanisms of monitoring and policing large firms versus small firms 
call for divergent bankruptcy regimes.277 The forgiving, reorganization-
focused, management-led bankruptcy system necessitated by our system 
of ex post controls over public corporations is simply inappropriate for 
small businesses, where the dominant means of monitoring and policing 
misbehavior is ex ante, through leverage over insiders. 
If the bankruptcy and corporate law systems are inherently inter-
twined and complementary, it seems unlikely that a single bankruptcy 
framework would be appropriate for large and small firms. We should 
expect legislative, judicial, and/or market adjustments to distinguish the 
274: See Mann, supra note 9, at 19-22 (noting that small business lenders generally do not 
monitor their borrowers). 
275. If the firm's primary lender has a lien on all of the firm's assets, but is undersecured, then 
that creditor is the residual claimholder. See, e.g., Skeel, Markets, Courts, supra note 70, at 512 
n.170. The debtor in possession retains substantial decision making authority. The insider 
guaranty is the mechanism for equating the interests of the two. 
276. Prior to the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, there were three separate 
chapters applicable to business reorganization. Chapter X was designed to handle cases involving 
public companies, Chapter XI handled most other business cases, and Chapter XII handled real 
estate reorganization. On the merging of these three separate regimes into a single framework, see, 
e.g., Hon. Leif M. Clark, Chapter 11: Does One Size Fit All, 4 AM. BANKR. mST. L. REv. 167, 
170-75 (1996); LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, supra note 77, at 745-49; Ralph A. 
Peeples, Staying In: Chapter 11, Close Corporations and the Absolute Priority Rule, 63 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 65, 66-72 (1989). 
277. See generally Skeel, Evolutionary Theory, supra note 24; see also Skeel, Markets, Courts, 
supra note 70, at 510-520 (suggesting that closely held and publicly held firms be governed by 
different bankruptcy regimes); LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, supra note 77 (arguing that 
Chapter 11 may be appropriate for large firm bankruptcies, but not for small business cases). But 
see Clark, supra note 276 (arguing that Chapter 11 may be an adequate structure for handling the 
reorganization of diverse entities, but that its functioning could be improved through greater 
training of bankruptcy judges). 
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bankruptcy treatment of these divergent business forms. These types of 
changes are actually taking place on the legislative and judicial fronts. 
For example, much attention has been paid to the judicial development 
of "fast track" bankruptcy for small business debtors, a system of close 
judicial control intended to reduce the waste and delay endemic to small 
business cases.278 The National Bankruptcy Review Commission has 
recommended extensive changes in the treatment of small business reor-
ganizations.z79 Congress has also addressed the problem of small busi-
ness bankruptcy in recent years, rejecting a proposal to establish a new 
"Chapter 10" to govern small business cases,280 but passing several 
minor reforms intended to make small business cases more efficient.281 
While attention is often focused on the legislative and judicial 
developments, the bankruptcy system also changes through marketplace 
adaptations which often go unnoted. There is evidence that the 1978 
Code increased lenders' costs, which in tum raised the price of loans to 
small businesses.282 It should be no surprise that lenders and borrowers 
are responding by seeking to reduce the costs imposed by the bank-
ruptcy system. Today, we are witnessing the rise of "bankruptcy 
278. See, e.g., Hon. Samuel L. Bufford, Chapter 11 Case Management and Delay Reduction: 
An Empirical Analysis, 4 AM. BANKR. mST. L. REv. 85 (1996); Hon. A. Thomas Small, Small 
Business Bankruptcy Cases, I AM. BANKR. mST. L. REv. 305 (1993); LoPucki, The Trouble with 
Chapter 11, supra note 77, at 751-52. 
279. See, e.g., Donald R. Korobkin, Vulnerability, Survival, and the Problem of Small Business 
Bankruptcy, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 413 (1994) (advocating Congressional reform of small business 
bankruptcy). 
280. Explaining the impetus behind the proposal, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
stated: 
Chapter II of the current Bankruptcy Code is required to handle both the corporate 
reorganizations of a multimillion-dollar international company and that of a small, 
rural grocery store. Trying to make these laws apply to vastly different corporate 
enterprises has created problems and inefficiencies in the handling of individual 
bankruptcy cases. As a result, this bill seeks to further experiment in the area of 
business reorganizations by establishing a small business bankruptcy chapter. Such 
a proposed pilot program balances the concerns of substantially rewriting the 
Bankruptcy Code with the need for additional information to guide congressional 
inquiry into problems faced by small businesses when they seek a bankruptcy 
reorganization. 
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, OMNIBUS BANKRUPTCY REFORM LEGISLATION, Before Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, S. REp. No. 279, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1992). 
281. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub L. No. 103-394, § 217, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994), 
created a new definition for "small business" (now codified at II U.S.C. § IOI(5IC». The act 
provided that if a debtor elects to be treated as a small business, the bankruptcy court need not 
appoint a creditors' committee (11 U.S.C. § 1102(3», tightened the provision for debtor's 
exclusive right to file a plan (II U.S.C. § II2I(e». It also provided a streamlined process for 
combining the hearings on approval of the disclosure statement and confirmation of the plan (II 
U.S.c. I I 25(f). 
282. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Scott & Terence C. Smith, The Effect of the Bankruptcy Reform Act 
of 1978 on Small Business Loan Pricing, 16 J. FIN. EcON. 119 (1986). 
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proofed" transactions, to name just one prominent example.283 Insider 
guaranties in general, and bankruptcy-contingent guaranties in particu-
lar, are marketplace innovations that respond to the changed costlbenefit 
calculations resulting from the adoption of a reorganization-biased bank-
ruptcy system. As experience with the current Bankruptcy Code has 
grown, the parties are adapting their contractual relationships to mini-
mize costs where it is a less-than-efficient device.284 Thus, the rise of 
springing guaranties - and the increasing use of insider guaranties -
may well be market adjustments intended to resegregate bankruptcy 
options according to firm characteristics. Under the new contractual 
regime, if it succeeds, bankruptcy reorganization would become less 
available for closely-held borrowers with institutional debt, while 
remaining available for public companies. 
Bankruptcy courts, of course, have had to deal with insider guaran-
ties on an individual, rather than systemic, level. The prevailing para-
digm has been the guaranty as a contract of financial assurance, an 
obligation of a third party largely outside the concern of the bankruptcy 
court. This approach has had its merits: By abstracting away from the 
interrelationship between insider guaranties and the financial agency 
problems that they are really intended to address, the law has permitted 
guaranties to remain largely unaffected by the bankruptcy of the bor-
rower. This provides contracting parties with a high level of certainty 
about their rights. 
The cost of this approach is that it ignores a large element of real-
ity. Insider guaranties are not simply contracts of financial support. 
They are a crucial link in the managerial and financial structure of 
closely-held firms, bonding devices used by lenders to exercise leverage 
over issues that cannot easily be controlled through explicit covenants 
written into a loan agreement. As such, a formalistic analysis, such as 
the categorization of guaranties as obligations of a third party that do not 
involve the debtor, is simply incorrect. Insider guaranties must be 
addressed through the same agency cost framework that has been so 
productively applied to other corporate, commercial, and bankruptcy law 
subjects. When this is done, we can make more rigorous and reasoned 
283. See, e.g., Gregory A. Tselikis, "Bankruptcy Proofing" Your Commercial Transactions: 
Reality or Myth, 13 ME. BAR J. 234 (1998); Sheryl A. Gussett, Bankruptcy Remote Entities in 
Structured Financings, AM. BANKR. lNST. J. 14 (March 1996); Richard M. Graf, Use of UCs as 
Bankruptcy-Proof Entities Widens, The Nat'! L.J., April 10, 1995, at B16. 
284. I have been unable to locate data on insider guaranties for the full time horizon to 
detennine whether their use increased with the passage of the Bankruptcy Code. Other data does 
seem to indicate that the use of insider guaranties increased between the late 1980s and early 
1990s, a period when lenders were becoming increasingly aware of the costs imposed by the 
Code. See Avery, supra note 98, at 1056-58. 
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decisions regarding the way in which reorganization of a financially 
troubled borrower should, or should not, be permitted to affect the liabil-
ities of insiders on these instruments. 
